TRAVEL & TOURS ADVISERS, INC. V. ALBERTO CRUZ, SR.

TRAVEL & TOURS ADVISERS, INC. V. ALBERTO CRUZ, SR.

G.R. NO. 199282 / DATE March 14, 2016

PONENTE PERALTA, J.

TOPIC: Contributory Negligence

FACTS:

Respondent Edgar Hernandez was driving an Isuzu Passenger Jitney (jeepney) that he owns along Angeles-Magalang Road, Barangay San Francisco, Magalang, Pampanga, on January 9, 1998, around 7:50 p.m. Meanwhile,. a Daewoo passenger bus (RCJ Bus Lines) owned by petitioner Travel and Tours Advisers, Inc. and driven by Edgar Calaycay travelled in the same direction as that of respondent Edgar Hernandez vehicle. Thereafter, the bus bumped the rear portion of the jeepney causing it to ram into an acacia tree which resulted in the death of Alberto Cruz, Jr. and the serious physical injuries of Virginia Muñoz.

Thus, respondents Edgar Hernandez, Virginia Muñoz and Alberto Cruz, Sr., father of the deceased Alberto Cruz, Jr., filed a complaint for damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 9006 before the RTC claiming that the collision was due to the reckless, negligent and imprudent manner by which Edgar Calaycay was driving the bus, in complete disregard to existing traffic laws, rules and regulations, and praying that judgment be rendered ordering Edgar Calaycay and petitioner Travel & Tours Advisers, Inc. to pay them.

For its defense, the petitioner claimed that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employee Edgar Calaycay and further argued that it was Edgar Hernandez who was driving his passenger jeepney in a reckless and imprudent manner by suddenly entering the lane of the petitioner's bus without seeing to it that the road was clear for him to enter said lane. In addition, petitioner alleged that at the time of the incident, Edgar Hernandez violated his franchise by travelling along an unauthorized line/route and that the jeepney was overloaded with passengers, and the deceased Alberto Cruz, Jr. was clinging at the back thereof.

ISSUE: Whether the contributory negligence of the jeepney driver will still make him entitled to damages?

RULING: Yes. But petitioner’s liability is mitigated.

At the time of the vehicular accident, the jeepney was in violation of its allowed route as found by the RTC and the CA, hence, the owner and driver of the jeepney likewise, are guilty of negligence as defined under Article 2179 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:When the plaintiffs negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

The petitioner and its driver, therefore, are not solely liable for the damages caused to the victims. The petitioner must thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence.²¹ It is, therefore, proper to mitigate the liability of the petitioner and its driver. The determination of the mitigation of the defendant's liability varies depending on the circumstances of each case.

In the present case, it has been established that the proximate cause of the death of Alberto Cruz, Jr. is the negligence of petitioner's bus driver, with the contributory negligence of respondent Edgar Hernandez, the driver and owner of the jeepney, hence, the heirs of Alberto Cruz, Jr. shall recover damages of only 50% of the award from petitioner and its driver. Necessarily, 50% shall be bourne by respondent Edgar Hernandez.

TEJA MARKETING AND/OR ANGEL JAUCIAN v. IAC COURT and PEDRO NALE

TEJA MARKETING AND/OR ANGEL JAUCIAN v. IAC COURT and PEDRO NALE

G.R. No. 65510

March 9, 1987

J. PARAS

FACTS:

On May 9, 1975, Pedro Nale bought from the plaintiff a motorcycle with complete accessories and a sidecar in the total consideration of P8,000.00. Downpayment of P1,700.00 with a promise that he would pay the balance within 60 days. However, he failed to comply with his promise and so upon his own request, the period of paying the balance was extended to one year in monthly installments until January 1976, when he stopped paying anymore. There was a chattel mortgage as a security, where it was made to show that it was sold to the Pedro was first mortgaged to the Teja Marketing by Angel Jaucian, though the Teja Marketing and Angel Jaucian are one and the same. It was made to appear that way because Pedro had no franchise of his own and he attached the unit to the plaintiff's MCH Line. Also, Teja Marketing/ Angel Jaucian was to undertake the yearly registration of the motorcycle. Lastly, the plaintiff explained also that though the ownership of the motorcycle was already transferred to the Pedro, the vehicle was still mortgaged with the consent of the defendant to the Rural Bank of Camaligan for the reason that all motorcycle purchased from the plaintiff on credit was rediscounted with the bank.

Pedro does not deny the sale and its terms. He however claims that he was not hiding the motorcycle, as it was only being used for transporting passengers and it kept on travelling from one place to another. Also, the vehicle sold to him mortgaged by the plaintiff with the Rural Bank of Camaligan without his consent and knowledge and the defendant was not even given a copy of the mortgage deed. Lastly, the plaintiff is to blame for not registering the motorcycle with the LTC and for not giving him the registration papers inspite of demands made. 

The lower court found that Pedro purchased the motorcycle particularly for the purpose of engaging and using the same in the transportation business. For this purpose the trimobile unit was attached to the plaintiffs transportation line who had the franchise, so much so that in the registration certificate, the plaintiff appears to be the owner of the unit. Furthermore, it appears to have been agreed, by both parties, that plaintiff would undertake the yearly registration of the unit in question with the LTC. Thus, for the registration of the unit for the year 1976, per agreement, the defendant gave to the plaintiff the amount of P82.00 for its registration, as well as the insurance coverage of the unit.

CA on appeal held that the purchase for the said operation was commonly known as the "kabit system.” Without the prior approval of the Board of Transportation, it was an illegal transaction involving the fictitious registration of the motor vehicle in the name of the private respondent so that he may traffic with the privileges of his franchise, or certificate of public convenience, to operate a tricycle service. Thus, parties in this case was in pari delicto.

ISSUE: WON the arrangement between the parties can be considered as a legal contract. NO

RULING:

Unquestionably, the parties herein operated under an arrangement, commonly known as the "kabit system" whereby a person who has been granted a certificate of public convenience allows another person who owns motor vehicles to operate under such franchise for a fee. A certificate of public convenience is a special privilege conferred by the government. Abuse of this privilege by the grantees thereof cannot be countenanced. The "kabit system" has been Identified as one of the root causes of the prevalence of graft and corruption in the government transportation offices.

Although not outrightly penalized as a criminal offense, the kabit system is invariably recognized as being contrary to public policy and, therefore, void and in existent under Article 1409 of the Civil Code. It is a fundamental principle that the court will not aid either party to enforce an illegal contract, but will leave both where it finds then. The defect of in existence of a contract is permanent and cannot be cured by ratification or by prescription. The mere lapse of time cannot give efficacy to contracts that are null and void.

SEALOADER SHIPPING CORP. VS. GRAND CEMENT MFG. CORP.,

SEALOADER SHIPPING CORP. VS. GRAND CEMENT MFG. CORP.,

G.R. NO. G.R. No. 167363

DATE Dec. 15, 2010

PONENTE Leonardo-De Castro, J.

FACTS:  

Sealoader Shipping Corporation (Sealoader) is corporation engaged in the business of shipping and hauling cargo. Grand Cement Manufacturing Corporation (Grand Cement) is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling cement. It maintains its own private wharf in San Fernando, Cebu, Philippines.

Sealoader executed a Time Charter Party Agreement Joyce Launch, which owned and operated the motor tugboat M/T Viper. Sealoader chartered the M/T Viper in order to tow the former’s unpropelled barges for a minimum period of fifteen days from the date of acceptance.

Subsequently, Sealoader entered into a contract with Grand Cement for the loading of cement clinkers and the delivery thereof to Manila. On March 31, 1994, Sealoaders barge, the D/B Toploader, arrived at the wharf of Grand Cement tugged by the M/T Viper. The D/B Toploader, however, was not immediately loaded with its intended cargo as the employees of Grand Cement were still loading another vessel, the Cargo Lift Tres.

On April 4, 1994, Typhoon Bising struck the Visayas area, with maximum recorded winds of 120 kilometers per hour. Public storm signal number 3 was raised over the province of Cebu. The D/B Toploader was, at that time, still docked at the wharf of Grand Cement. In the afternoon of said date, as the winds blew stronger and the waves grew higher, the M/T Viper tried to tow the D/B Toploader away from the wharf. The efforts of the tugboat were foiled, however, as the towing line connecting the two vessels snapped. This occurred as the mooring lines securing the D/B Toploader to the wharf were not cast off. The following day, the employees of Grand Cement discovered the D/B Toploader situated on top of the wharf, apparently having rammed the same and causing significant damage thereto.

Grand Cement filed a Complaint for Damages against Sealoader.However, Sealoader insisted that Joyce Launch should have been sued in its stead, as the latter was the owner and operator of the M/T Viper. Having complete physical control of the M/T Viper, as well as the towing, docking, mooring and berthing of the D/B Toploader.

Sealoader directly blame on Grand Cement and Joyce Launch. It argues that the negligent acts allegedly committed by Grand Cement should bar its recovery of damages in view of the doctrine of last clear chance. Sealoader reiterates that the damage to the wharf was ultimately caused by the failure of Grand Cement to cast off the mooring lines attached to the D/B Toploader at the height of the typhoon. The second sentence of Article 2179 of the Civil Code on contributory negligence was supposedly inapplicable in the instant case, considering that Sealoader was not negligent at all. Sealoader again insists that the D/B Toploader was entirely dependent on the M/T Viper for movement. Thus, the failure of the M/T Viper to tow the D/B Toploader to safety should not be charged to the latter. 

ISSUE: Is the doctrine of last clear chance applicable in the present case?

RULING:

No. The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss. Negligence is defined as the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do, or as Judge Cooley defines it, (T)he failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.

Sealoader was negligent for the lack of a radio or any navigational communication facility aboard the D/B Toploader. There is also a manifest laxity of the crew of the D/B Toploader in monitoring the weather. Despite the apparent difficulty in receiving weather bulletins from the head office of Sealoader, the evidence on record suggests that the crew of the D/B Toploader failed to keep a watchful eye on the prevailing weather conditions. 

The crew of the D/B Toploader and the M/T Viper were caught unawares and unprepared when Typhoon Bising struck their vicinity. According to the Sworn Statement of Acosta, which was taken barely three months after the typhoon, he was already informed of the approaching typhoon. 

Grand Cement was not guilty of negligent acts, which contributed to the damage that was incurred on its wharf. Sealoader had the responsibility to inform itself of the prevailing weather conditions in the areas where its vessel was set to sail. Sealoader cannot merely rely on other vessels for weather updates and warnings on approaching storms, as what apparently happened in this case. Common sense and reason dictates this.To do so would be to gamble with the safety of its own vessel, putting the lives of its crew under the mercy of the sea, as well as running the risk of causing damage to the property of third parties for which it would necessarily be liable.

The Court finds that the evidence presented by Sealoader to prove the negligence of Grand Cement was marred by contradictions and are, thus, weak at best. Accordingly, the doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to the instant case.

SANTOS VS. SIBUG

SANTOS VS. SIBUG

G.R. NO. L-26815

May 26, 1981

Melencio-Herrera, J.

FACTS:

Vicente Vidad is a duly authorized passenger jeepney operator. Prior to the accident date, Santos was the owner of a passenger jeep, but he had no certificate of public convenience for the operation of the vehicle as a public passenger jeep. He then transferred his jeep to the name of Vidad so that it could be operated under the latter’s certificate of public convenience. Santos, in effect, became a kabit operator.

On the accident date, Sibug was bumped by a passenger jeepney operated by Vidad and driven by Gragas. As a result thereof, Sibug filed a complaint for damages against Vidad and Gragas.

The trial court sentenced Vidad and Gragas, jointly and severally, to pay Sibug for the damages he suffered.

Sheriff of Manila levied on a motor vehicle registered in the name of Vidad (but owned by Santos).

Santos presented a third-party claim with the Sheriff alleging actual ownership of the motor vehicle levied upon, and stating that registration thereof in the name of Vidad was merely to enable Santos to make use of Vidad’s certificate of public convenience.

ISSUE/S: WON the subject motor vehicle owned by Santos should be attached to satisfy the money judgment against Vidad who is the registered owner of the same.

RULING: YES.

Sec. 20 (g) of the Public Service Act: “... it shall be unlawful for any public service or for the owner, lessee or operator thereof, without the approval and authorization of the Commission previously had – ... (g) to sell, alienate, mortgage, encumber or lease its property, franchise, certificates, privileges, or rights, or any part thereof.”

In this case, Santos had fictitiously sold the jeepney to Vidad, who had become the registered owner and operator of record at the time of the accident. It is true that Vidad had executed a re-sale to Santos, but the document was not registered. Although Santos, as the kabit was the true owner as against Vidad, the latter, as the registered owner/operator and grantee of the franchise, is directly and primarily responsible and liable for the damages caused to Sibug, the injured party, as a consequence of the negligent or careless operation of the vehicle.

This ruling is based on the principle that the operator of record is considered the operator of the vehicle in contemplation of law as regards the public and third persons even if the vehicle involved in the accident had been sold to another where such sale had not been approved by the then Public Service Commission. For the same basic reason, as the vehicle here in question was registered in Vidad’s name, the levy on execution against said vehicle should be enforced so that the judgment in the Branch XVII case may be satisfied, notwithstanding the fact that the secret ownership of the vehicle belonged to another. Santos, as the kabit should not be allowed to defeat the levy on his vehicle and to avoid his responsibilities as a kabit owner for he had led the public to believe that the vehicle belonged to Vidad. This is one way of curbing the pernicious kabit system that facilitates the commission of fraud against the travelling public.

PNR V. ETHEL BRUNTY

PNR V. ETHEL BRUNTY

G.R. NO.169891

DATE: November 2, 2006

PONENTE: Callejo, Sr., J.

FACTS:

Rhonda Brunty, an American citizen and daughter of Ehtel Brunty, visited the Philippines. Before her departure, she with her Filipino host, Juan Manuel Garcia, went to Baguio on board a Mercedez Benz driven by Mercelita, around 12 midnight. On the other hand, a PNR train bound for Tutuban, Manila left La Union station at 11pm. At around 2am, the Benz was approaching the railroad crossing at Moncada, Tarlac. The car was running at a speed of 70km/hr and had overtaken a vehicle when it collided with the PNR train. Brunty was rushed to the hospital, but was pronounced dead 10 minutes after arrival, while Garcia suffered severe head injuries.

A demand letter was sent to PNR which did not respond. A complaint for damages was filed against it.  PNR argues that since there is freedom of control and greater maneuverability on the part of motor vehicles, it is obvious that in railroad crossings, they have the last clear chance to prevent or avoid an unwanted accident from taking place.

RTC: PNR negligent; CA: affirmed

ISSUE/S: WON the doctrine of last clear chance applies

RULING: NO. The proximate cause of the injury having been established to be the negligence of PNR, the doctrine finds no application in the instant case.

PNR was negligent because of its failure to provide the necessary safety device to ensure the safety of motorists in crossing the railroad track: (1.) absence of flagbars or safety railroad bars; (2.) inadequacy of the installed warning signals; and (3.) lack of proper lighting within the area.

Thus, even if there was a flagman stationed at the site as claimed by PNR, it would still be impossible to know or see that there is a railroad crossing/tracks ahead, or that there is an approaching train from the Moncada side of the road since one’s view would be blocked by a cockpit arena. A vehicle coming from the Moncada side would have difficulty in knowing that there is an approaching train because of the slight curve, more so, at an unholy hour as 2:00 a.m. Thus, it is imperative on the part of the PNR to provide adequate safety equipment in the area

This Court has previously determined the liability of the PNR for damages for its failure to put a cross bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman, or semaphores. Such failure is evidence of negligence and disregard of the safety of the public, even if there is no law or ordinance requiring it because public safety demands that said device or equipment be installed.

There was a contributory negligence on the part driver of the Mercedez Benz, Mercelita, as the place was not properly illuminated; one’s view was blocked by a cockpit arena; and Mercelita was unfamiliar with the place, yet he drove at 70km/hr and had overtaken a vehicle before arriving at the railroad track. However, the effect of contributory negligence on the mitigation of liability does not apply here. Both before the lower courts, no damages were awarded to Mercelita and he did not appeal. There is neither proof as to the relationship between Mercelita and Rhonda Brunty.

PERENA VS. ZARATE

PERENA VS. ZARATE

G.R. NO. 157917

August 29, 2012

Bersamin, J.

FACTS:

Perenas were engaged in the business of transporting students to Don Bosco. The Zarates engaged Perenas services to transport their son, Aaron, to school.

While on the way to school, the van’s air-conditioned unit was turned on and the stereo playing loudly. The driver took a detour because they were running late due to the traffic in SLEX. The detour was through a narrow path underneath the Magallanes Interchange used as short cut into Makati. When the van was to traverse the PNR railroad crossing, the van was tailing a large passenger bus so the driver’s view of the oncoming train was blocked. The train hit the van at the rear end and the impact threw 9 students including Aaron out of the van. Aaron landed in the path of the train which dragged his body and severed his head, instantaneously killing him.

The Zarates filed for damages against Alfaro, Perenas, PNR, and the train driver. The cause of action against Perena was for contract of carriage while for PNR, quasi delict. Perena posited the defense of diligence of a good father in the selection and supervision of their driver

ISSUE/S: Were Perenas and PNR jointly and severally liable for damages? Is the petitioner a common carrier?

RULING:

YES. A school bus operator is a common carrier.

Perena’s defense of diligence of a good father in the selection and supervision of their driver is unavailable for breach of contract of carriage. Perenas operated as a common carrier; and their standard of care was extraordinary diligence, not only diligence of a good father.

A carrier is a person or corporation who undertakes to transport or convey goods from one place to another, gratuitously or for hire. They may be private or common

Private carrier is one who, without holding himself or itself out to the public as ready to act for all who may desire his or its services, undertakes, by special agreement in a particular instance only, to transport goods or persons from one place to another either gratutitously or for hire. The diligence required of a private carrier is only ordinary

Common Carrier is a person, corporation, firm or association engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering such services to the public. Diligence required is to observe extraordinary diligence, and is presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently in case of the loss of effects of passengers, or death or injuries to passengers

The true test for a common carrier is not the quantity or extent of business actually transacted, or the number of conveyances, BUT WHETHER the undertaking is a part of the activity that he has held out to the general public as his business or occupation.

The Perenas held themselves out as a ready transportation indiscriminately to the students of a particular school living within or near where they operated the service and for a fee. Perena, being a common carrier, was already presumed to be negligent at the time of the accident because death occurred to their passenger. The omissions of care on the part of the driver constituted negligence.

NATIONAL LABOR UNION VS. BENEDICTO DINGLASAN

NATIONAL LABOR UNION VS. BENEDICTO DINGLASAN

G.R. NO. L-7945

23 March, 1959

Padilla, J.

FACTS:

Respondent Dinglasan is the owner and operator of TPU jeepneys plying between España-Quiapo-Pier and vice versa. Petitioners are drivers who had verbal contracts with Respondent for the use of the latter’s jeepneys upon payment of P7.50 for 10 hours use, otherwise known as the “boundary system”. Said drivers did not receive salaries or wages from Mr. Dinglasan; their day’s earnings being the excess over the P7.50 that they paid for the use of the jeepneys. In the event that they did not earn more, Respondent did not have to pay them anything; Mr. Dinglasan’s supervision over the drivers consisted in inspection of the jeepneys that they took out when they passed his gasoline station for water, checking the route prescribed by the Public Service Commission, or whether any driver was driving recklessly and washing and changing the tires of jeepneys.

Petitioners filed a complaint against respondent for unfair labor practices.

ISSUE: WON there is an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent.

RULING: YES. The drivers did not invest a single centavo in the business and the Respondent is the exclusive owner of the jeeps. The management of the business is in the Respondent’s hands. For even if the drivers of the jeeps take material possession of the jeeps, still the Respondent as owner thereof and holder of a certificate of public convenience is entitled to exercise, as he does and under the law he must, supervision over the drivers by seeing to it that they follow the route prescribed by the Public Service Commission and the rules and regulations promulgated by it as regards their operation. And when they pass by the gasoline station of the Respondent, checking by his employees on the water tank, oil, and tire pressure is done.

The only features that would make the relationship of lessor and lessee between the Respondent and the drivers, members of the union, as contended by the Respondent, are the fact that he does not pay them any fixed wage but their compensation is the excess of the total amount of fares earned or collected by them over and above the amount of P7.50 which they agreed to pay to the Respondent, the owner of the jeeps, and the fact that the gasoline burned by the jeeps is for the account of the drivers. These two features are not, however, sufficient to withdraw the relationship between them from that of employer-employee, because the estimated earnings for fares must be over and above the amount they agreed to pay to the Respondent for a ten-hour shift or ten-hour a day operation of the jeeps.

Not having any interest in the business because they did not invest anything in the acquisition of the jeeps and did not participate in the management thereof, their service as drivers of the jeeps being their only contribution to the business, the relationship of lessor and lessee cannot be sustained. In the lease of chattels the lessor loses complete control over the chattel leased although the lessee cannot make bad use thereof, for he would be responsible for damages to the lessor should he do so. In this case there is a supervision and a sort of control that the owner of the jeeps exercises over the drivers. It is an attempt by ingenious scheme to withdraw the relationship between the owner of the jeeps and the drivers thereof from the operation of the labor laws enacted to promote industrial peace.