Aninao vs Asturias

FACTS:

• Subject of this case are several parcels of land situated in Brgys. Baha and Talibayog, Calatagan, Batangas, and formerly owned by Ceferino Ascue (Ascue).
• Emancipation patents (EPs) covering the disputed lands were issued to 323 agrarian reform beneficiaries pursuant to Operation Land Transfer (OLT) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27 and/or Executive Order (EO) No. 228
• MARO sent a ‘Final Notification’  letter to the heirs of Ascue relative to the payment of their land transfer claim
• DAR Region IV Office requested the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to open a trust account in favor of Ascue in an amount corresponding to the valuation of his agricultural property.
• The heirs of Ascue, with the approval of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Balayan, Batangas handling the settlement his estate (sic), sold to Asturias Chemical Industries, Inc. (“Asturias”) the 807 hectares of land referred to at the outset.
• Years later, Asturias was disturbed by the initial activities undertaken by the DAR to place its remaining landholding under CARP
• Asturias made it known that its Calatagan landholding could no longer be considered for CARP coverage, it having “already been declared as mineral land pursuant to a Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (‘MPSA’) between the government and Asturias” and that “an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) [has already been] issued …for the establishment of a cement plant within the area”
• DAR Regional Director issued a certificate of exemption over the remaining 284.9323 hectares of land of Ascue, now owned by Asturias. The exemption order was based on the findings that “only fifteen (15) hectares, more or less, are planted with crops such as upland rice, bananas, corn and coconut while the rest, with an area of 284.9323 hectares, are undeveloped, slopes of more than 18%, rocky, swampy, and/ or mangrove areas and therefore not suitable for agricultural purposes.”
• The Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee (PARCCOM) issued Res. No. 02 urging the Registry of Deeds – Nasugbu, Batangas to cancel/consider null and void the land transaction between Ascue and Asturias if proven that it was concluded in violation of existing laws.
• PARO of Batangas formed the Task Force o ascertain if the standard operating procedures were followed in accordance with the policies and guidelines of PD 27 and CARL; to determine whether the property was planted to rice /corn as of 1972 and to verify the existence of tenancy relationship.
• Asturias formally protested the OLT coverage of portions of its Calatagan property and the threatened cancellation of its titles . . . . The grounds cited for the protest fall under these headings: (1) “The Asturias Landholding is NOT AND NEVER WAS a RICE and CORN farm”; and (2) The issuance of the alleged 818 EPs and the coverage of the Asturias property under PD # 27 is ERRONEOUSAND WITHOUT DUE PROCESS.”
• DAR sustained the protest of Asturias and recalled/nullified the coverage of the property in question under OLT. The ruling was predicated on the following premises: (a) the landholding is not primarily devoted to rice/corn production; (b) the existence of tenancy relations has not been clearly established; and (c) the property had long ceased to be agricultural: it has become mineral land.
• Subsequently, two (2) groups, each claiming to be farmer-beneficiaries, separately moved for reconsideration. These were denied
• The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners’ petition for review for “being insufficient in form for failing to comply with the requirements under Section 3, Rule 46 and Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.”

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are farmer-beneficiaries of the subject property

HELD:

• No.
• As may be noted, EPs were issued to petitioners as agrarian reform beneficiaries or successors-in–interests pursuant to the OLT program under P.D. No. 27. To come within the coverage of the OLT, there must be showing that the land is devoted to rice or corn crops, and there must be a system of share-crop or lease tenancy obtaining therein when P.D. No. 27 took effect on October 21, 1972.[18] If either requisite is absent, exclusion from the OLT coverage lies and EPs, if issued, may be recalled.
• In the case at bench, it has been peremptorily determined by OP and, before it, by the DAR, acting on investigations reports of its provincial (Batangas) office, as reviewed and validated by its regional office, that the OLT coverage of the disputed landholdings was erroneous, it being established that the lands covered are not primarily devoted to rice and corn and that the tenancy relationship has not been clearly established. Absent palpable error by both agencies, of which this Court finds none, their determination as to the use of the property and/or to the dubious status of petitioners as de jure tenants is  controlling.
• In the matter of petitioners’ non-compliance with the procedural requirement on forum shopping, we find no reversible error in the appealed dismissal action of the appellate court.  We agree with the Court of Appeals that the requirements on the filing of a certification against forum shopping should be strictly complied with.  It bears stressing that a petition involving two or more petitioners must be accompanied by a certification of non-forum shopping accomplished by all petitioners, or by one who is authorized to represent them; otherwise, the petition shall be considered as defective and, under the terms of Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, may be dismissed.

Province of Camarines Sur vs CA

FACTS:

• On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees.
• Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, Hon. Luis R.Villafuerte, filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin
• Trial court authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount of P5,714.00, the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that private respondents may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper. The trial court issued a writ of possession.
• In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that the complaints for expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order denying the motion to dismiss and allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property subject of the expropriation be set aside.
• Province of Camarines Sur claimed that it has the authority to initiate the expropriation proceedings under the Local Government Code
• CA set aside the order of the trial court. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.

ISSUE:  Whether or not the subject property may be expropriated by the local government’s exercise of power of eminent domain

HELD:

• Yes
• To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.
• It should be noted that CA did not rule on the validity of the questioned resolution; neither did it dismiss the complaints. However, when the Court of Appeals ordered the suspension of the proceedings until the Province of Camarines Sur shall have obtained the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to change the classification of the lands sought to be expropriated from agricultural to non-agricultural use, it assumed that the resolution is valid and that the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.

DAR vs DECS

FACTS:

• In controversy are 2 lots consisting of an aggregate area of 189.2462 hectares located at Hacienda Fe, Escalante, Negros Occidental and Brgy. Gen. Luna, Sagay, Negros Occidental.
• These lands were donated by the late Esteban Jalandoni to respondent DECS. Consequently, titles thereto were transferred in the name of respondent DECS
• DECS leased the lands to Anglo Agricultural Corporation
• Eugenio Alpar and several others, claiming to be permanent and regular farm workers of the subject lands, filed a petition for Compulsory Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage with MARO
• MARO sent a “Notice of Coverage” to respondent DECS, stating that the subject lands are now covered by CARP
• DAR Regional Director approved MARO’s recommendation
• DECS appealed the case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform which affirmed the Order of the Regional Director.
• DECS’ contention: Respondent DECS sought exemption from CARP coverage on the ground that all the income derived from its contract of lease with Anglo Agricultural Corporation were actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes, such as for the repairs and renovations of schools in the nearby locality.
• DAR’s contention: Petitioner DAR, on the other hand, argued that the lands subject hereof are not exempt from the CARP coverage because the same are not actually, directly and exclusively used as school sites or campuses, as they are in fact leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation.  Further, to be exempt from the coverage, it is the land per se, not the income derived therefrom, that must be actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes.

ISSUE:   Whether or not the subject properties are exempt from the coverage of CARP

HELD:  

• No.
• The general policy under CARL is to cover as much lands suitable for agriculture as possible. Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 sets out the coverage of CARP.  It states that the program shall “cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands xxx including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.”
• The records of the case show that the subject properties were formerly private agricultural lands owned by the late Esteban Jalandoni, and were donated to respondent DECS.  From that time until they were leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation, the lands continued to be agricultural primarily planted to sugarcane, albeit part of the public domain being owned by an agency of the government.[12] Moreover, there is no legislative or presidential act, before and after the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, classifying the said lands as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.  Indubitably, the subject lands fall under the classification of lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture.
• Clearly, a reading of par c, Sec 10 of CARL shows that, in order to be exempt from the coverage: 1) the land must be “actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be necessary;” and 2) the purpose is “for school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes.”
• The importance of the phrase “actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be necessary” cannot be understated, as what respondent DECS would want us to do by not taking the words in their literal and technical definitions. The words of the law are clear and unambiguous.  Thus, the “plain meaning rule” or verba legis in statutory construction is applicable in this case.  Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.

Central Mindanao University vs DARAB

FACTS:

• CMU is an agricultural university. From its beginning, the school was the answer to the crying need for training people in order to develop the agricultural potential of the island of Mindanao. Those who planned and established the school had a vision as to the future development of that part of the Philippines.
• Pres. Carlos Garcia issued Proclamation No. 476, withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College, a site which would be the future campus of what is now the CMU.
• In the course of the cadastral hearing of the school's petition for registration of the aforementioned grant of agricultural land, several tribes belonging to cultural communities, opposed the petition claiming ownership of certain ancestral lands forming part of the tribal reservations. Some of the claims were granted so that what was titled to the present petitioner school was reduced from 3,401 hectares to 3,080 hectares.
•  In 1984, the CMU approved Resolution No. 160, adopting a livelihood program called "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program" under which the land resources of the University were leased to its faculty and employees. This arrangement was covered by a written contract. Under this program the faculty and staff combine themselves to groups of five members each, and the CMU provided technical know-how, practical training and all kinds of assistance, to enable each group to cultivate 4 to 5 hectares of land for the lowland rice project. Each group pays the CMU a service fee and also a land use participant's fee. The contract prohibits participants and their hired workers to establish houses or live in the project area and to use the cultivated land as a collateral for any kind of loan. It was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between the CMU and the faculty and/or employees. This particular program was conceived as a multi-disciplinary applied research extension and productivity program to utilize available land, train people in modern agricultural technology and at the same time give the faculty and staff opportunities within the confines of the CMU reservation to earn additional income to augment their salaries.
• When petitioner Dr. Leonardo Chua became President of the CMU in July 1986, he discontinued the Agri-Business Management and Training Project, due to losses incurred while carrying on the said project. Some CMU personnel, among whom were the complainants, were laid-off when this project was discontinued.
• Another project was launched o develop unutilized land resources, mobilize and promote the spirit of self-reliance, provide socio-economic and technical training in actual field project implementation and augment the income of the faculty and the staff. This has the same nature as of the Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program with an express provision that there would be no tenant-landlord relationship.
• The contract expired. Some were renewed, some were not. The non-renewal of the contracts, the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar cane project, the loss of jobs due to termination or separation from the service and the alleged harassment by school authorities, all contributed to, and precipitated the filing of the complaint.
• DARAB found that the private respondents were not tenants and cannot therefore be beneficiaries under the CARP. At the same time, the DARAB ordered the segregation of 400 hectares of suitable, compact and contiguous portions of the CMU land and their inclusion in the CARP for distribution to qualified beneficiaries.
• Complainants Obrique, et al. claimed that they are tenants of the CMU and/or landless peasants claiming/occupying a part or portion of the CMU.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not the complainants are tenants of CMU, hence, beneficiaries of CARP
•  Whether or not CMU is subject to CARP
• Whether or not DARAB has jurisdiction to hear and decide Case No. 005 for Declaration of Status of Tenants and coverage of land under the CARP

HELD:

First Issue:

• We agree with the DARAB's finding that Obrique, et. al. are not tenants. Under the terms of the written agreement signed by Obrique, et. al., pursuant to the livelihood program called "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program", it was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between the CMU and the faculty and staff (participants in the project). The CMU did not receive any share from the harvest/fruits of the land tilled by the participants. What the CMU collected was a nominal service fee and land use participant's fee in consideration of all the kinds of assistance given to the participants by the CMU. Again, the agreement signed by the participants under the CMU-IEP clearly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed, and that the participants are not share croppers nor lessees, and the CMU did not share in the produce of the participants' labor.
• Obrique is not a landless peasant. The facts showed he was Physics Instructor at CMU holding a very responsible position was separated from the service on account of certain irregularities he committed while Assistant Director of the Agri-Business Project of cultivating lowland rice. Others may, at the moment, own no land in Bukidnon but they may not necessarily be so destitute in their places of origin. No proof whatsoever appears in the record to show that they are landless peasants.
• In view of the above, the private respondents, not being tenants nor proven to be landless peasants, cannot qualify as beneficiaries under the CARP.
• The portion of the CMU land leased to the Philippine Packing Corporation (now Del Monte Phils., Inc.) was leased long before the CARP was passed. The agreement with the Philippine Packing Corporation was not a lease but a Management and Development Agreement, a joint undertaking where use by the Philippine Packing Corporation of the land was part of the CMU research program, with the direct participation of faculty and students. Said projects were directly connected to the purpose and objectives of the CMU as an educational institution.

Second Issue:

•  It is our opinion that the 400 hectares ordered segregated by the DARAB and affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated August 20, 1990, is not covered by the CARP because:
• 1.    It is not alienable and disposable land of the public domain;
  2.    The CMU land reservation is not in excess of specific limits as determined by Congress;
  3.    It is private land registered and titled in the name of its lawful owner, the CMU;
  4.    It is exempt from coverage under Section 10 of R.A. 6657 because the lands are actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for school site and campus, including experimental farm stations for educational purposes, and for establishing seed and seedling research and pilot production centers

Third Issue:

• DARAB has no jurisdiction. Under Section 4 and Section 10 of R.A. 6657, it is crystal clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited only to matters involving the implementation of the CARP. More specifically, it is restricted to agrarian cases and controversies involving lands falling within the coverage of the aforementioned program. It does not include those which are actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for, among such purposes, school sites and campuses for setting up experimental farm stations, research and pilot production centers, etc
• In the case at bar, the DARAB found that the complainants are not share tenants or lease holders of the CMU, yet it ordered the "segregation of a suitable compact and contiguous area of Four Hundred hectares, more or less", from the CMU land reservation, and directed the DAR Regional Director to implement its order of segregation. Having found that the complainants in this agrarian dispute for Declaration of Tenancy Status are not entitled to claim as beneficiaries of the CARP because they are not share tenants or leaseholders, its order for the segregation of 400 hectares of the CMU land was without legal authority.

Milestone Farms vs Office of the President

FACTS:

• Among the pertinent secondary purposes of Milestone Farms are 1) to engage in the raising of cattle, pigs, and other livestock; 2) to breed, raise, and sell poultry; and 3) to import cattle, pigs, and other livestock, and animal food necessary for the raising of said cattle, pigs, and other livestock
• On June 10, 1988, CARL took effect
• In May 1993, petitioner applied for the exemption/exclusion of its 316.0422-hectare property pursuant to the aforementioned ruling of this Court in Luz Farms.
• Meanwhile, on December 27, 1993, DAR issued AO No. 9, Series of 1993, setting forth rules and regulations to govern the exclusion of agricultural lands used for livestock, poultry, and swine raising from CARP coverage.
• Milestone re-documented its application pursuant to said AO.
• DAR’s Land Use Conversion and Exemption Committee (LUCEC) conducted an ocular inspection on petitioner’s property and recommended the exemption of petitioner’s 316.0422-hectare property from the coverage of CARP.
• DAR Regional Director Dalugdug adopted LUCEC’s recommendation
• The Pinugay Farmers, represented by Balajadia, moved for the reconsideration of the said Order, but the same was denied by Director Dalugdug. Hence, they filed an appeal with DAR Secretary
• Subsequently, Milestone filed a complaint for Forcible Entry against Balajadia and company before the MCTC.
• MCTC ruled in favor of Milestone
• RTC reversed the decision of MCTC
• CA ruled in favor of Milestone
• DAR Secretary Garilao issued an Order exempting from CARP only 240.9776 hectares of the 316.0422 hectares previously exempted by Director Dalugdug, and declaring 75.0646 hectares of the property to be covered by CARP.
• Office of the President primarily reinstated the decision of Director Dalugdug but when the farmers filed a motion for reconsideration, Office of the President reinstated the decision of Director Garilao.
• CA primarily ruled in favor of Milestone in exempting the entire property from the coverage of CARP. However, six months earlier, without the knowledge of the CA – as the parties did not inform the appellate court – then DAR Secretary Villa issued DAR conversion order granting petitioner’s application to convert portions of the 316.0422-hectare property from agricultural to residential and golf courses use. The portions converted was with a total area of 153.3049 hectares. With this Conversion Order, the area of the property subject of the controversy was effectively reduced to 162.7373 hectares.
• With the CA now made aware of these developments, particularly Secretary Villa’s Conversion Order, CA had to acknowledge that the property subject of the controversy would now be limited to the remaining 162.7373 hectares. CA, in its amended decision, states that the subject landholding from the coverage of CARP is hereby lifted, and the 162.7373 hectare-agricultural portion thereof is hereby declared covered by the CARP.

ISSUE: Whether or not Milestone’s property should be exempted from the coverage of CARP

HELD:

• No.
• When CA made its decision, DAR AO No. 9 was not yet declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Thus, it could not be said that the CA erred or gravely abused its discretion in respecting the mandate of DAR A.O. No. 9, which was then subsisting and in full force and effect.
• As correctly held by respondent OP, the CA correctly held that the subject property is not exempt from the coverage of the CARP, as substantial pieces of evidence show that the said property is not exclusively devoted to livestock, swine, and/or poultry raising.

DAR vs Delia Sutton

FACTS:

• The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents which has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding.   On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law.
• On June 10, 1988, CARL took effect.
• In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
• MARO inspected respondents’ land and found that it was devoted solely to cattle-raising and breeding.  He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
• DAR ignored their request
• DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which provided that only portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL.   In determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed the following retention limits, viz:  1:1 animal-land ratio.
• DAR Secretary Garilao issued an Order partially granting the application of respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL. Respondents moved for reconsideration.  They contend that their entire landholding should be exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising.  Their motion was denied.
• Office of the President affirmed the order of DAR
• On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents.  It declared DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, void for being contrary to the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the land reform program of the government.

ISSUE:  Whether or not DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which prescribes a maximum retention limit for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising is constitutional.

HELD:

• Assailed AO is unconstitutional.
• In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it    contravenes the Constitution.  The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership.   However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry- raising.

Luz Farms vs Sec of DAR

FACTS:

• Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of some provisions of CARP.
• Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made to apply to it:

(a)     Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity.

(b)     Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and swine raising . . ."

(c)     Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.

(d)     Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law

(e)     Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13

". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands are distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and above the compensation they currently receive xxx

ISSUE: The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage

HELD:

• Said provisions are unconstitutional.
• The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.
• Commissioner Tadeo: Ipinaaalam ko kay Commissioner Regalado na hindi namin inilagay ang agricultural worker sa kadahilanang kasama rito ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers. Ang inilagay namin dito ay farm worker kaya hindi kasama ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers.
• It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform.

Heirs of Pedro Atega vs Garilao

FACTS:

• The heirs of Pedro Atega owned a parcel of land containing an area of 129.4615 hectares. In December 1992 they received notice from the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO) that their land was subject of compulsory acquisition and distribution pursuant to RA 6657. They protested before the MARO the inclusion of their property in the CARP arguing that their land was classified as non-agricultural.  Apparently, the MARO ignored their protest.
• Petitioners filed with DAR-Region XIII an Application for Exemption from the coverage of CARP.  But their application for exemption was denied on the ground that SP Ordinance No. 33-79 invoked by them was not submitted for approval to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) as required.
• Petitioners thereafter filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus which assailed the Resolution of respondent Regional Director denying their Application for Exemption.
• CA dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioners acted prematurely in filing the petition before the appellate court.  The appellate court held that petitioners should have first exhausted all the available administrative remedies.
• Hence this petition
• Petitioners contention: the Regional Director gravely abused his authority in ruling that SP Resolution No. 33-79 of the City of Butuan was not submitted to the HLURB for approval.  They point out that per certification issued by the HLURB attached to their Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals, SP Resolution No. 33-79 was actually submitted to and approved by the HLURB.

ISSUE:  Whether or not the subject properties shall be covered by CARP

HELD:

• YES
• A meticulous perusal of the records would reveal that the certification issued by the HLURB to the petitioners did not even mention, much less can it be fairly inferred therefrom, that what was submitted and approved was indeed SP Resolution No. 33-79, contrary to the assertion of petitioners.
• According to DAR Adm. Order No. 6-94 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 44-90, an Application for Exemption from the coverage of CARP filed before the Regional Director must be accompanied by a certification from the HLURB that the pertinent zoning ordinance has been approved by the Board prior to 15 June 1988, the date when the CARL took effect.  In the instant case, no such accompanying certification from the HLURB was filed by petitioners.

Natalia Realty Inc and Estate Developers & Investors Corp vs DAR

FACTS:

• Petitioner Natalia is the owner of three contiguous parcels of land located in Banaba, Antipolo, Rizal.
• On 18 April 1979, Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20,312 hectares of land located in the Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo and Montalban as townsite areas to absorb the population overspill in the metropolis which were designated as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite. The Natalia properties are situated within the areas proclaimed as townsite reservation.
• EDIC, developer of Natalia, applied for and was granted preliminary approval and locational clearances by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. Petitioners were likewise issued development permits after complying with the requirements. Thus the Natalia properties later became the Antipolo Hills Subdivision.
• On 15 June 1988, CARL was enacted.
• DAR, through MARO, issued a Notice of Coverage on the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision which consisted of roughly 90.3307 hectares.
• Natalia and EDIC protested to this.
• Members of the Samahan ng Magsasaka sa Bundok Antipolo, Inc. (SAMBA), filed a complaint against Natalia and EDIC before the DAR Regional Adjudicator to restrain petitioners from developing areas under cultivation by SAMBA members.
• DAR Regional ruled by temporarily restraining petitioners from further developing the subdivision.
• Petitioners elevated their cause to DARAB but the latter merely remanded the case to the Regional Adjudicator for further proceedings
• Natalia wrote respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform reiterating its request to set aside the Notice of Coverage. Neither respondent Secretary nor respondent Director took action on the protest-letters.
• Hence, this petition.
• Natalia’s contention: Subject properties already ceased to be agricultural lands when they were included in the areas reserved by presidential fiat for townsite reservation.
• OSG’s contention: The permits granted petitioners were not valid and binding because they did not comply with the implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957, otherwise known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree," in that no application for conversion of the NATALIA lands from agricultural to residential was ever filed with the DAR. In other words, there was no valid conversion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject properties shall be included in the coverage of CARP

HELD:

• NO.
• Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall "cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands." As to what constitutes "agricultural land," it is referred to as "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. "Agricultural lands" are only those lands which are "arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands."
• Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language be considered as "agricultural lands." These lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation.

Ting vs Heirs of Diego Lirio

FACTS:

• In a decision in 1976, CFI granted the application filed by the Lirio spouses for registration of title to a certain lot
• The said decision become final and executor in 1977
• In 1982, the judge of CFI directed the Land Registration Commission to issue the corresponding decree of registration and the certificate of title in favor of the spouses Lirio.
• On Febraury 12, 1997, Petitioner Ting filed an application to register title to the same lot with the RTC of Cebu
• The respondents, heirs of Lirio, filed their Answer calling attention to the 1976 decision which had become final and executor in 1977 and which, they argued, barred the filing of Ting’s application on the ground of res judicata
• The RTC dismissed petitioner’s application on the ground of res judicata
• Petitioner argues that although the 1976 decision had become final and executor in 1977, no decree of registration has been issued by the Land Registration Authority.
• Petitioner contends that the LRA has not issued the decree of registration and that a certain Engr. Rafaela Belleza claimed that the survey of the Cebu Cadastral Extension is erroneous and all resurvey within the Cebu Cadastral extension must first be approved by the Land Management Services of the DENR, Region 7, Cebu City before said resurvey may be used in court

ISSUE:   W/N the 1976 decision constitutes res judicata in Ting’s application for registration

RULING:

• YES. In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private land, with or without opposition, the judgment of the court confirming the title of the applicant or oppositor, as the case may be, and ordering its registration in his name constitutes, when final, res judicata against the whole world. It becomes final when no appeal within the reglementary period is taken from a judgment of confirmation and registration.

Atty. Gomez vs Court of Appeals

FACTS:

• Atty. Gomez et al applied for registration of several lots before RTC
• Said lots were involved in Government vs Abran case where SC declared Consolacion Gomez as the owner. Teodoro and Luis (Consolacion’s father and son) inherited the lots. When Teodoro died, Luis executed a Quitclaim in favor of the Gomezes.
• In 1981, RTC adjudicated the lots in favor of the Gomezes. Subsequently, RTC issued an order directing the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue the corresponding decrees of registration over the lots.
• In 1984, Perez, Chief of the Division of Original Registration, Land Registration Commission (now known as the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration), submitted a report to the RTC stating that the Lots were already covered by homestead patents issued in 1928 and 1929 and registered under the Land Registration Act. Perez then recommended that the 1981 order be set aside.
• The Gomezes opposed the report, pointing out that no opposition was raised by the Bureau of Lands during the registration proceedings and the 1981 decision should be implemented because it had long become final and executor.
• RTC then set aside its earlier decision.
• CA affirmed the new decision of RTC holding that 1) prior to the issuance of the decree of registration, RTC Judge has still the power and control over the decision he rendered; 2) The finality of an adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case takes place only after the expiration of the one-year period after entry of the final decree of registration
• Gomez et al argued that 1) under Sec 30 and 32 of PD 1529, the 5 Aug 1981 decision having become final, it may no longer be reopened, reviewed, much less, set aside; 2) Perez has no alternative but to issue the decrees of registration because his duty is purely ministerial; 3) "the law of the case" is the decision in Gov’t v. Abran, which held that the lands adjudicated to Consolacion Gomez were not public lands thus, they could not have been acquired by holders of homestead titles as against them; 4) by sustaining the 5 Aug 1981 decision, the homestead title holders may still vindicate their rights by filing a separate civil action for cancellation of titles and for reconveyance in a court of ordinary civil jurisdiction

ISSUE: Would finality of the decision adjudicating the land to the Gomezes bar the RTC from setting it aside?

HELD:

• NO. Adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility, until after the expiration of 1 year after the entry of the final decree of registration. As long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Commission and the period of 1 year has not elapsed from date of entry of the decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it.
• Duty of the land registration officials to issue the decree is NOT purely ministerial. If land registration officials are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the court.
• The lots were not private lands of Consolacion Gomez when homestead patents were issued over them in 1928-1929. Gov’t vs. Abran, is not "the law of the case." It was promulgated only on 31 Dec 1931.
• The Gomezes can be the ones to vindicate their rights instead. If they are the true owner, they may bring an action to have the ownership or title to land judicially settled.

Republic vs Herbieto

Facts:

• Respondents are Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and David, who filed with the MTC a single application for registration of two parcels of land. They claimed to be owners by virtue of its purchase from their parents
• Republic filed an opposition arguing that: (1) Respondents failed to comply with the period of adverse possession required by law; (2) Respondents’ muniments of title were not genuine and did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the Subject Lots; and (3) The Subject Lots were part of the public domain
• MTC granted the application for registration of the parcels of land of Jeremias and David.
• CA affirmed the decision of MTC holding that the subject property, being alienable since 1963 as shown by CENRO Report dated June 23, 1963, may now be the object of prescription, thus susceptible of private ownership.
• Republic appealed to the SC contending that 1) MTC had no jurisdiction since there was a procedural defect in filing of a single application for two parcels of land; 2) Respondents failed to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of owners since 12 June 1945 or earlier.

ISSUE: W/N there is a procedural defect which resulted to MTC’s lack of jurisdiction

HELD:

• YES, but not with the ground stated by the petitioner, but because respondents, failed to comply with the publication requirements mandated by the Property Registration Decree.
• Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of jurisdiction of the court to hear and proceed with the case.[26] They are not even accepted grounds for dismissal thereof
• PUBLICATION: MTC did not acquire jurisdiction because publication on the Freeman and the Banat News was only done 3 months after the hearing which renders inutile the intention of the mandatory publication. In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was held on 03 September 1999.  While the Notice thereof was printed in the issue of the Official Gazette, dated 02 August 1999, and officially released on 10 August 1999, it was published in The Freeman Banat News only on 19 December 1999, more than three months after the initial hearing. Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after the date of the initial hearing, would already be worthless and ineffective.  Whoever read the Notice as it was published in The Freeman Banat News and had a claim to the Subject Lots was deprived of due process for it was already too late for him to appear before the MTC on the day of the initial hearing to oppose respondents’ application for registration, and to present his claim and evidence in support of such claim
• With regard to period of possession, Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of the Subject Lots for the judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title. The said lots are public lands classified as alienable and disposable only on June 25, 1963 and the respondents were seeking for a confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title through judicial legalization. Under Sec.48 of the Public Land Act, which is the ruling law in this case, Respondents were not able to prove their continuous ownership of the land since June 12, 1945 or earlier, because said lands were only classified as alienable and disposable only on June 25, 1963

Republic vs San Lorenzo

FACTS:

• San Lorenzo Development Corporation filed with the MTCC of Danao City an application for registration of title to a parcel of land. This was opposed by the Republic
•  The date for the initial hearing was reset for many times
• The case called aloud in open court to determine whether there were other oppositors aside from the Republic. There being none, the court issued an Order of General Default
• Respondent corporation presented several documents and witnesses as evidence
• MTCC rendered decision granting respondent’s application
• It is important to take note of the following dates:

Ø  May 15, 1988 – The trial court issued an order

Ø  June 6, 1988 – The notice of initial hearing was issued

Ø  September 23, 1988 – The hearing was actually held

• On appeal, petitioner Republic maintains that the MCTC never acquired jurisdiction over the case on account of its failure to conduct the initial hearing thereof within the period fixed in Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 which mandates that the date and hour of initial hearing shall not be earlier than 45 days nor later than 90 days from the date of the Order.
• In such case, the initial hearing should have been set NOT earlier than June 29, 1988 (45 days from May 15, 1998) and NOT later than August 13, 1998 (which is 90 days from May 15, 1998).
• CA dismissed Republic’s appeal.

ISSUE: W/N the defective notice of publication of initial hearing vested the trial court with jurisdiction

RULING:

• YES. Respondent Corporation should NOT BE FAULTED if the initial hearing was conducted on September 23, 1995 was outside the 90-day period set forth under Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. Respondent Corporation has substantially complied with the requirements under the registration of the land.
• A party cannot intervene in matters within the exclusive power of the trial court. No fault is attributable to such party if the trial court errs on matters within its sole power. It is unfair to punish an applicant for an act or omission over which the applicant has neither responsibility nor control, especially if the applicant has complied with all the requirements of the law.
• As held in Republic vs Manna Properties, The duty and the power to set the hearing date lie with the land registration court. After an applicant has filed his application, the law requires the issuance of a court order setting the initial hearing date. The notice of initial hearing is a court document. The notice of initial hearing is signed by the judge and copy of the notice is mailed by the clerk of court to the LRA [Land Registration Authority]. This involves a process to which the party applicant absolutely has no participation.
•  However, the Supreme Court found that the respondent corporation can only prove possession because of the tax declarations it presented for the year 1948, 1963 and 1964. This does NOT constitute the evidence necessary to acquire the title through adverse occupation under CA 141. All that the CENRO certificate evidences is the alienability of the land involved, not the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof by the respondent or its predecessors-in-interest for the period prescribed by law.
•  Hence, SC ruled in favor of Republic