STONEHILL VS. DIOKNO

FACTS:  Upon application of the officers of the government, Respondents-Judges — issued on different dates a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein and/or the corporations of which they were officers, directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit: Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers) as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."

Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law, the said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.

In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.

ISSUE: WON the search warrants issued are valid.

HELD: With regard the search issued in the corporation – valid; with regard the search in the houses – void.

RATIO: As regards the first group(In the offices), we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.⁸ Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,⁹ and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. ¹⁰ Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.

Second in their houses: Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws. the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD

NOTE: This is a consolidated case with (Pimentel v. COMELEC) and (Atty. Laserna v. DDB and PDEA), regarding the constitutionality of RA 9165(c), (d), (f) and (g); ComprehensiveDangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

FACTS:  In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue. As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.—Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results.  x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test.  x x x  The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.—Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school’s student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices.—Officers and employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the company’s work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace.  Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

(Pimentel v. COMELEC | G.R. No. 16158)

On Dec. 23, 2003, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations for the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 2004 elections. Pimentel claims that Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency.  Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.

(SJS v. DDM & PDEA | G.R. 157870)

In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a  registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing.  For another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable.  And for a third, a person’s constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions.

(Atty. Laserna v. DDB & PDEA | G.R. 158633)

Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.

ISSUE/S:

1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution?

2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause?

HELD:

1) YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for senator. NO, Congress CANNOT enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution.

2) The Court held that, paragraphs (c) and (d) are CONSTITUTIONAL; while paragraphs (f) and (g) are UNCONSITUTIONAL. Only paragraphs (f) and (g) violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause.

RATIO:

1) Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution (refer to the aforementioned facts). As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that “[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test.”  Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.

Congress’ inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. As early as 1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following wise: “Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the Government, like the boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as governments acting under delegated authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x are limited and confined within the four walls of the constitution or the charter, and each department can only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied from the given powers.  The Constitution is the shore of legislative authority against which the waves of legislative enactment may dash, but over which it cannot leap.”

Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation. The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights[12] and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for senators.

In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.

2) The Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165(c) requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies.  To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements. A random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable, but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted and protected.

Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165(d) for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that “subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy,” has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution. Petitioner Laserna’s lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration.

The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In context, the right to privacy means the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities; and while there has been general agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against unwarranted search, “translation of the abstract prohibition against ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ into workable broad guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task,” to borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal Court. Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy   yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the state’s exercise of police power.

As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held, “reasonableness” is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees concerned shall be subjected to “random drug test as contained in the company’s work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place.” It is to be noted the very reason RA 9165 was enacted is to safeguard the well-being of the citizens from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs.

Paragraph (f) of RA 9165 was declared unconstitutional by the Court. Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily  from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.

The Court finds the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor’s office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment.  The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are “randomness” and “suspicionless.”  In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor’s office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless.  The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint.  They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion.  When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will.  The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor’s office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165.  Drug testing in this case would violate a persons’ right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

POSADAS VS. CA

FACTS: On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar, both members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While they were within the premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously.

They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his resistance.

They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver, two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. They brought the petitioner to the police station for further investigation. In the course of the same, the petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so. He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the prohibited articles recovered from him were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City wherein after a plea of not guilty and trial on the merits a decision was rendered on October 8, 1987 finding petitioner guilty of the offense

ISSUE: WON the search without warrant is valid.

HELD: YES it is valid.

RATIO: There are many instances where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, foremost of which is the "stop and search" without a search warrant at military or police checkpoints. Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search thereat in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.

It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too late.

PEOPLE v. SALANGUIT

FACTS: Two criminal cases were filed against Salanguit, the first for possession/use of shabu, and the second, for possession/use of marijuana.  Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied in the RTC of Cavite a warrant to search the premises of Robert Salanguit for shabu and shabu paraphernalias. He presented as a witness Edmund Badua, an undercover officer, which transacted with Salanguit for the purchase of shabu.

The application was granted and the team of Aguilar proceeded to the premises of Salanguit in QC to serve the warrant. The operatives proceeded to knock on Salanguit’s door but the same was left unanswered. The operatives heard people panicking inside the house and they began to force their way inside the house. They indicated their authority to conduct the search and began which yielded to the finding of clear plastic bags with shabu and 2 bricks of dried marijuana leaves covered in newspaper.

Salanguit refused to sign the receipt for the confiscated drugs. During his arraignment, he pleaded not guilty and in the trial court, he gave stated that he never got the chance to review the purported warrant that Aguilar and his team has. He further stated that the operatives ate their food and took his cash and valuable, as well as canned goods.

The RTC found him guilty for possession/use of shabu and marijuana. Salanguit appealed the said decision and argues that the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence is inadmissible as evidence against him on the ground that the warrant used to obtain it was invalid and that the marijuana seized from him was also inadmissible as evidence against him pursuant to the plain view doctrine, and that the operatives employed unnecessary force in executing the warrant.

ISSUES:

1. W/N the warrant used to seize the shabu was valid and the said shabu was inadmissible in evidence against him.

2. W/N the marijuana seized was admissible in evidence against Salanguit pursuant to plain view doctrine.

HELD:

1. Yes, all the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant were satisfied.

2. No, the marijuana was not one of the drugs indicated in the warrant and it was not in plain view when it was seized.

RATIO:

1. The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia. Salanguit contends that it should be void as it did not indicate the existence of drug paraphernalias. The warrant was valid as to the seizure of shabu and void as to the seizure of drug paraphernalia. It is to be noted that no drug paraphernalia was seized. Salanguit further contends that the warrant was issued for more than one specific offense because possession or uses are punished under two different provisions in the Dangerous Drugs Act. This Court has decided in the case of People v Dichoso that a warrant that does not specify what provisions of the law were violated, is valid as to the authority to search and seize marijuana, shabu and drug paraphernalias. Lastly, Salanguit argues that the search warrant failed to indicate the place to be searched with sufficient particularity. The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place to be searched. The location of Salanguit’s house being indicated by the evidence on record, there can be no doubt that the warrant described the place to be searched with sufficient particularity.

2. Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to the police operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets and shabu first. Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the plain view doctrine can no longer provide basis for admitting the other items subsequently found. The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to justify their seizure. Not being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint could not have been readily discernible as marijuana. That being said, we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against Salanguit.

PEOPLE V MUSA

FACTS:

On 14 December 1989, the accused sold 2 wrappers containing marijuana leaves to Sgt. Amado Ani in a buy-bust operation in Zamboanga City.

The said buy-bust operation was planned since a civilian informer told that Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana and therefore, a test-buy was conducted the day prior to the said buy-bust operation. During the buy-bust operation, after Sgt. Ani handed the money to Musa, Musa entered his house to get the wrappings. Upon his return and with the inspection of the wrappings, Musa was arrested, but the marked money used as payment cannot be found with him, prompting the NARCOM agents to go inside his house. There, they could not find the marked money, but they found more marijuana leaves hidden in a plastic bag inside the kitchen.

The leaves were confirmed as marijuana by the forensic chemist of the PC crime laboratory, who later on served as a witness, along with T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, the team leader of the buy-bust operation and Sgt. Ani.

The defense gave a different version of what happened on 14 December 1989 wherein he and his wife, Ahara Musa, served as witnesses. They said that the NARCOM agents, dressed in civilian clothes, got inside their house since the door was open, and upon entering, declared that they were NARCOM agents and searched the house, despite demands of the couple for a search warrant. The agents found a red bag whose contents were unknown to the Musas.

Musa was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the trial court.

On appeal, Musa contests that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. He also questioned the credibility of the witnesses, as well as the admissibility of the seized plastic bag as evidence since it violates his constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures provided in Art. III, Sec. 2.

ISSUES:

1.     WON Musa is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt

2.     WON the seized plastic bag containing marijuana is admissible as evidence.

HELD/RATIO:

1.   Yes. The testimony given by T/Sgt. Belarga only strengthened the testimony of Sgt. Ani since it was the testimony of the latter that served as direct evidence, being enough to prove the consummation of the sale of the prohibited drug, and that their testimonies were not conflicting as well.

2.     No. Although the warrantless search done falls under Sec. 12 of Rule 126 and that the search may include premises or surroundings under the accused’s immediate control, it does not fall under the “Plain View” doctrine. The agents found the plastic bag inside the kitchen, and upon asking about the contents of the bag, the accused did not answer, making the agents open the bag and find marijuana leaves. Even if an object is observed in "plain view," the "plain view" doctrine will not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the "plain view" of the object.

NALA V. BARROSO, GR NO. 153087 AUGUST 7, 2003

FACTS:

PO3 Macrino L. Alcoser applied for the issuance of a warrant to search the person and residence of the petitioner Bernard R. Nala in connection with petitioner’s alleged illegal possession of one caliber .22 magnum and one 9 mm. pistol in violation of the law on Illegal Possession of Firearms.

On the same day, after examining Alcoser and his witness Ruel Nalagon, respondent judge of RTC of Malaybalay City issued Search and Seizure warrant against “Romulo Nala alias Lolong Nala who is said to be residing at Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaaotao, Bukidnon.”

On July 4, 2001, at around 6:30am, Alcoser and other police officers searched petitioner’s house and allegedly seized the following articles: (a) one piece caliber .38 revolver (snub-nose) with Serial Number 1125609 (b) one piece fragmentation grenade (cacao type) (c) one piece .22 long barrel (d) 5 pieces live ammunition for caliber .38 revolver (e) 4 pieces of disposable lighter and unestimated numbers of cellophane used for packing of shabu.

The following day, a criminal case was filed against the petitioner for illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives.

The petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion seeking to (1) Quash Search and Seizure Warrant (2) declare inadmissible for any purpose the items allegedly seized under the said warrant (3) direct release of the air rifle seized by the police officers.

The respondent Judge however denied the said Motion to Quash but ordered the return of the air rifle to the petitioner. Respondent stated that there was probable cause which was duly established from the deposition and examination of the witness and the testimony of Alcoser. the fact that the items seized were not exactly the items seized bear a direct relation to the crime of illegal possession of firearms. Also, the respondent Judge found that the petitioner was sufficiently identified in the warrant although his first name was erroneously stated therein as “Romulo” and not as “Bernard”, considering that the warrant was couched in terms that would make it enforceable against the person and residence of petitioner and no other. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was also denied.

Hence, he filed the instant petition alleging that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned orders. The instant petition was also filed directly to this Court in disregard of the rule on hierarchy of courts. We opt to take cognizance of this petition in order to address the urgency and seriousness of the constitutional issues raised.

ISSUES:

1.     Whether or not the petitioner was sufficiently described in the search and seizure warrant?

2.  Whether or not there was probable cause for the issuance of a search and seizure warrant against the petitioner?

3.    Whether or not the firearms and explosive allegedly found in petitioner’s residence are admissible as evidence against him even though said firearms were not listed in the search and seizure warrant?

HELD:

1.     Yes, the petitioner was sufficiently described in the search and seizure warrant.

2.    No, the affidavit and testimony of the witness and PO3 Alcoser failed to establish the existence of probable cause.

3.     No because the search and seizure warrant was not valid hence the items seized are inadmissible.

RATIO:

1.    On the first issue, the failure to correctly state in the search and seizure warrant the first name of petitioner, which is “Bernard” and not “Romulo” or “Rumolo”, does not invalidate the warrant because the additional description “alias Lolong Nala who is said to be residing at Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao, Bukidnon” sufficiently enabled the police officers to locate and identify the petitioner.  What is prohibited is a warrant against an unnamed party, and not one which, as in the instant case, contains a descriptio personae that will enable the officer to identify the accused without difficulty

2.   Nowhere, however, in the affidavit and testimony of witness Ruel Nalagon nor in PO3 Macrino L. Alcoser’s application for the issuance of a search warrant was it mentioned that petitioner had no license to possess a firearm.  While Alcoser testified before the respondent judge that the firearms in the possession of petitioner are not licensed, this does not qualify as “personal knowledge” but only “personal belief” because neither he nor Nalagon verified, much more secured, a certification from the appropriate government agency that petitioner was not licensed to possess a firearm.  This could have been the best evidence obtainable to prove that petitioner had no license to possess firearms and ammunitions, but the police officers failed to present the same.

the fact remains that both the applicant, PO3 Macrino L. Alcoser, and his witness Ruel Nalagon did not have personal knowledge of petitioner’s lack of license to possess firearms, ammunitions and explosive; and did not adduce the evidence required to prove the existence of probable cause that petitioner had no license to possess a firearm.  Hence, the search and seizure warrant issued on the basis of the evidence presented is void.

3.     Conformably, the articles allegedly seized in the house of petitioner cannot be used as evidence against him because access therein was gained by the police officer using a void search and seizure warrant.  It is as if they entered petitioner’s house without a warrant, making their entry therein illegal, and the items seized, inadmissible. Moreover, it does not follow that because an offense is malum prohibitum, the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A warrant is still necessary, because possession of any firearm becomes unlawful only if the required permit or license therefor is not first obtained.

The items seized in petitioner’s house, being “fruits of the poisonous tree”, are “inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.” The exclusion of these unlawfully seized evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. Hence, the complaints filed against petitioner for illegal possession of firearms and explosive based on illegally obtained evidence have no more leg to stand on

AL­GHOUL VS. COURT OF APPEALS (2001)

FACTS: Judge Mangay, presideing judge of the RTC, issued search warrants 5 for the search and seizure of certain items in Apartment No. 2 in Kalookan City. Subsequently, the police searched Apartment No. 8, in the same compound and found one (1) .45 caliber pistol. Found in Apartment No. 2 were various firearms, ammunitions, explosives and other incendiary devices. The said items seized were acknowledged in the receipt signed by SPO2 De La Cruz.

Petitioners Yousef Al-Ghoul et al. were charged with illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives, pursuant to PD No. 1866. Thereafter, petitioners were arrested and detained. The petitioners filed a motion for bail. They also objected to the admissibility of the evidence obtained.

Petitioners contend that the search and seizure orders violated Sections 2 and 3 of the Bill of Rights as well as Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure because the place searched and articles seized were not described with particularity. They argue that the two-witness requirement under Section 10 of Rule 126 was ignored when only one witness signed the receipt for the properties seized during the search, and said witness was not presented at the trial. Petitioners also aver that the presumption of regularity of the implementation of the search warrant was rebutted by the defense during cross-examination of prosecution witnesses. 

ISSUE/S:

(1) WON the items obtained in the said search are admissible as evidence.

(2) WON there was lack of particularity in the description of objects to be seized pursuant to the warrants. 

(3) WON the two-witness rule under Sec. 10, Rule 126 ROC applies.

HELD:

(1) Evidence from Apartment No. 2 is admissible however, the search made at Apartment No. 8 is illegal and the .45 caliber pistol taken thereat is inadmissible in evidence against petitioners since there was no mention of the said apartment in the search warrants issued.

(2) No, the articles seized during the search of Apartment No. 2 are of the same kind and nature as those items enumerated in the search warrants.

(3) No, the two-witness rule does not apply since the petitioners were present when the search and seizure operation was conducted.

RATIO:

(1)Upon perusal by Court of the said search warrants 54-95 and 55-95, it specified the place to be searched, namely Apartment No. 2 in Kalookan City however, there was no mention of Apartment No. 8.  The search conducted at Apartment No. 8 clearly violated Sections 2 and 3 (2) of the Bill of Rights, in relation to Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

PICOP v. Asuncion: the place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged nor amplified by the police. Policemen may not be restrained from pursuing their task with vigor, but in doing so, care must be taken that constitutional and legal safeguards are not disregarded. Exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. Hence, the search made at Apartment No. 8 is illegal and the .45 caliber pistol taken thereat is inadmissible in evidence against petitioners.

(2) The search warrants in question specifically mentioned Apartment No. 2. The search was done in the presence of its occupants, herein petitioners, in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court. They alleged lack of particularity yet, the Court held that the articles seized during the search of Apartment No. 2 are of the same kind and nature as those items enumerated in the search warrants. The items seized from Apartment No. 2 were described with specificity in the warrants in question. The nature of the items ordered to be seized did not require a technical description. Moreover, the law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute details as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities, otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a search warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Once described, the articles subject of the search and seizure need not be so invariant as to require absolute concordance, in our view, between those seized and those described in the warrant. Substantial similarity of those articles described as a class or species would suffice.

One of the tests to determine the particularity in the description of objects to be seized under a search warrant is when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. A careful examination of search warrants show that they were worded in such a manner that the enumerated items to be seized could bear a direct relation to the offense of violation of Section 1 and 3 of PD 1866, as amended, penalizing illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives. What the warrants authorized was the seizure of articles proscribed by that decree, and no other.

(3) SEC. 10. Receipt for the property seized.—The officer seizing property under the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the lawful occupant of the premises in whose presence the search and seizure were made, or in the absence of such occupant, must, in the presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property.

Clearly, the two-witness rule applies only in the absence of the lawful occupants of the premises searched. In the case at bar, petitioners were present when the search and seizure operation was conducted by the police at Apartment No. 2. More importantly, petitioner Nabeel Al-Riyami y Nasser admitted being an actual occupant/resident of Apartment No. 2. Hence, there is no violation of Section 10, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court.

TAN VS GALLARDO (1976)

FACTS: Petitioners in this case seek the annulment of respondent Judge’s orders in criminal cases denying petitioners’ motion for respondent judge to disqualify or inhibit himself from hearing and acting upon their Motion for New Trial. The SC issued a Resolution asking the respondent Judge to file his answer. Said Resolution also issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin the respondent from further proceeding with the criminal cases.

The Solicitor General informed the SC that they are "persuaded that there are bases for stating that the rendition of respondent Judge's decision and his resolution on the motion for new trial were not free from suspicion of bias and prejudice. The OSG further submits that the case should he remanded to the trial court for the rendition of a new decision and with instruction to receive additional evidence proferred by the accused with the right of the prosecution to present rebuttal evidence as may be warranted.

Private prosecutors submitted their Comment in justification of the challenged Orders of the respondent Judge and objected to the remand of this case.

*contentions:

Petitioner claimed that the private prosecutor has absolutely no standing in the instant proceedings.

The private prosecutors now contend that they are entitled to appear before this Court, to take part in the proceedings, and to adopt a position in contravention to that of the Solicitor General.

ISSUE: Whether or not the private prosecutors have the right to intervene independently of the Solicitor General and to adopt a stand inconsistent with that of the latter in the present proceedings.

HELD: NO. To begin with, it will be noted that the participation of the private prosecution in the instant case was delimited by this Court in its Resolution of October 1, 1975, thus: "to collaborate with the Solicitor General in the preparation of the Answer and pleadings that may be required by this Court." To collaborate means to cooperate with and to assist the Solicitor General. It was never intended that the private prosecutors could adopt a stand independent of or in contravention of the position taken by the Solicitor General.

The role of the private prosecutors is to represent the offended party, with respect to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense. 'This civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party either expressly waives the civil action or reserves to institute it separately. Therefore, although the private prosecutors may be permitted to intervene, they are not in control of the case, and their interests are subordinate to those of the People of the Philippines represented by the fiscal.

It is evident, therefore, that since the Solicitor General alone is authorized to represent the State or the People of the Philippines the interest of the private prosecutors is subordinate to that of the State and they cannot be allowed to take a stand inconsistent with that of the Solicitor General, for that would be tantamount to giving the latter the direction and control of the criminal proceedings, contrary to the provisions of law and the settled rules on the matter.

PEOPLE VS. GODOFREDO TEVES (1999)

FACTS: The Prosecutors office of Cavite file 4 separate charges of rape against Godofredo for raping her 13 year old daughter  “CHERRY” 4 times to wit; On new years day of 1995, a week after the new years day of 1995, sometime on 1993 and January 23, 1995. On the new years day rape Godofredo raped her when she was washing the dishes, a week after when she was taking a bath and her father asked her to hand over the dipper and suddenly after obeying went inside the bathroom, January 23 1995 when her father asked her younger brother to buy cigar.

The RTC of Cavite convicted Godofredo for all this instances of rape and sentenced him to death. The information filed by the Prosecutor only contained the generic circumstances of Abuse of superior strength and force and intimidation. The RTC of Cavite sentenced him to death, Pursuant to Section 11 of the amendatory statute, the death penalty may be imposed in rape cases under the last paragraph of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, when the rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1.     When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consaguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

ISSUE: WON Godofredo can be sentenced to death when only the generic aggravating circumstance and not the qualifying circumstance is alleged in the information filed by the prosecutor.

HELD: No, the penalty should only be for the one alleged in the information.

RATIO: These seven attendant circumstances, given that they alter the nature of the crime of rape and thus increase the degree of the penalty, are in the nature of qualifying circumstances. Plainly, these attendant circumstances added by R.A. No. 7659 are not mere aggravating circumstances, which merely increase the period of the penalty. So we held in People v. Ramos, the effect that a qualifying circumstance must be specifically pleaded in the information, thus:

While Republic Act No. 7659 did not give a legal designation to the crime of rape attended by any of the seven new circumstances introduced in Article 335 on December 31, 1993, this Court has referred to such crime as qualified rape in a number of its decisions. However, with or without a name for this kind of rape, the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender give a different character to the rape defined in the first part of Article 335. They raise the imposable penalty upon a person accused of rape from reclusion perpetua to the higher and supreme penalty of death. Such an effect conjointly puts relationship and minority of the offended party into the nature of a special qualifying circumstance.

As this qualifying circumstance was not pleaded in the information or in the complaint against appellant, he cannot be convicted of qualified rape because he was not properly informed that he is being accused of qualified rape. The Constitution guarantees the right of every person accused in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. This right finds amplification and implementation in the different provisions of the Rules of Court. Foremost among these enabling provisions is the office of an information.

Anent the Constitutional right afforded an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of an accusation against him, as implemented by the relevant provisions of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, Section 9 of Rule 110 provides:

Sec. 9. Cause of accusation. — The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition, not necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged and enable the court to pronounce a judgment.

Pertinent to this case is the phrase of the current set of adjective rules: "a person of common understanding,"

In this light, we hold that the informations do not sufficiently allege the twin special qualifying circumstances of the victim's age and the relationship between the culprit and the victim. What strikes us about the informations is that, as phrased, they unduly lay stress on the generic aggravating circumstance of "taking advantage of superior strength."  Be it in terms of syntax or composition, the wording of the informations is unable to sufficiently notify the accused, a person of common understanding or ordinary intelligence, of the gravity or nature of the crime he had been charged with, especially considering that generic aggravating circumstace of taking advantage of superior strength is not even an element of the attendant circumstances treated under number 1 of the last paragraph of Article 335. The aforequoted clauses in the informations can thus not be read nor understood as constituting a specific allegation of the special circumstances of relationship of father and daughter and that the daughter was less than 18 years of age at the time the crime of rape was committed.