PEOPLE VS. GODOFREDO TEVES (1999)

FACTS: The Prosecutors office of Cavite file 4 separate charges of rape against Godofredo for raping her 13 year old daughter  “CHERRY” 4 times to wit; On new years day of 1995, a week after the new years day of 1995, sometime on 1993 and January 23, 1995. On the new years day rape Godofredo raped her when she was washing the dishes, a week after when she was taking a bath and her father asked her to hand over the dipper and suddenly after obeying went inside the bathroom, January 23 1995 when her father asked her younger brother to buy cigar.

The RTC of Cavite convicted Godofredo for all this instances of rape and sentenced him to death. The information filed by the Prosecutor only contained the generic circumstances of Abuse of superior strength and force and intimidation. The RTC of Cavite sentenced him to death, Pursuant to Section 11 of the amendatory statute, the death penalty may be imposed in rape cases under the last paragraph of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, when the rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1.     When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consaguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

ISSUE: WON Godofredo can be sentenced to death when only the generic aggravating circumstance and not the qualifying circumstance is alleged in the information filed by the prosecutor.

HELD: No, the penalty should only be for the one alleged in the information.

RATIO: These seven attendant circumstances, given that they alter the nature of the crime of rape and thus increase the degree of the penalty, are in the nature of qualifying circumstances. Plainly, these attendant circumstances added by R.A. No. 7659 are not mere aggravating circumstances, which merely increase the period of the penalty. So we held in People v. Ramos, the effect that a qualifying circumstance must be specifically pleaded in the information, thus:

While Republic Act No. 7659 did not give a legal designation to the crime of rape attended by any of the seven new circumstances introduced in Article 335 on December 31, 1993, this Court has referred to such crime as qualified rape in a number of its decisions. However, with or without a name for this kind of rape, the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender give a different character to the rape defined in the first part of Article 335. They raise the imposable penalty upon a person accused of rape from reclusion perpetua to the higher and supreme penalty of death. Such an effect conjointly puts relationship and minority of the offended party into the nature of a special qualifying circumstance.

As this qualifying circumstance was not pleaded in the information or in the complaint against appellant, he cannot be convicted of qualified rape because he was not properly informed that he is being accused of qualified rape. The Constitution guarantees the right of every person accused in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. This right finds amplification and implementation in the different provisions of the Rules of Court. Foremost among these enabling provisions is the office of an information.

Anent the Constitutional right afforded an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of an accusation against him, as implemented by the relevant provisions of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, Section 9 of Rule 110 provides:

Sec. 9. Cause of accusation. — The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition, not necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged and enable the court to pronounce a judgment.

Pertinent to this case is the phrase of the current set of adjective rules: "a person of common understanding,"

In this light, we hold that the informations do not sufficiently allege the twin special qualifying circumstances of the victim's age and the relationship between the culprit and the victim. What strikes us about the informations is that, as phrased, they unduly lay stress on the generic aggravating circumstance of "taking advantage of superior strength."  Be it in terms of syntax or composition, the wording of the informations is unable to sufficiently notify the accused, a person of common understanding or ordinary intelligence, of the gravity or nature of the crime he had been charged with, especially considering that generic aggravating circumstace of taking advantage of superior strength is not even an element of the attendant circumstances treated under number 1 of the last paragraph of Article 335. The aforequoted clauses in the informations can thus not be read nor understood as constituting a specific allegation of the special circumstances of relationship of father and daughter and that the daughter was less than 18 years of age at the time the crime of rape was committed.