Mendoza v. Reyes, 124 SCRA 154

FACTS: Ponciano and Julia were married in 1915. The properties in question consisting of Lots 5 and 6, were bought on installment basis. Thus, the spouses jointly obtained a loan to pay their balance. The corresponding deed of absolute sale was executed where the vendee named is 'Julia de Reyes'. Her signatures appear over the caption vendee and those of Ponciano under the phrase: 'with my marital consent. As a result of these sales, TCTs were issued in the name of "JULIA REYES married to PONCIANO REYES."

While Ponciano was absent attending his farm in Pampanga, Julia sold absolutely the lots in question Efren V. Mendoza and Inocencia R. De Mendoza, as vendees, without the knowledge and consent of Ponciano. At the same time the spouses were living separately and were not in speaking terms.

Ponciano filed a complaint for the annulment of a deed of sale of two parcels of land contending that said properties were conjugal properties of himself and his wife and that she had sold them to petitioners "all by herself" and without his knowledge or consent.

Petitioner Mendozas alleged that the properties were paraphernal properties of Julia and that they had purchased the same in good faith and for adequate consideration.  Julia testified that she bought the two parcels of land on installment basis and that the first payment came from her personal funds.  The CFI declared the properties exclusive and paraphernal properties of Julia and ruled that she could validly dispose of the same without the consent of her husband.

ISSUE: WON the disputed properties are conjugal properties.

HELD: Yes. The deed of sale is declared null and void with respect to one- half share of Ponciano.

Article 153 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 153. The following are conjugal partnership property:

That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;

It is sufficient to prove that the property was acquired during the marriage in order that the same may be deemed conjugal property. There is no question that the disputed property was acquired by onerous title during the marriage.

Records show that the funds came from loans obtained by the spouses. Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, all debts and obligations contracted by the husband and the wife for the benefit of the conjugal partnership are liabilities of the partnership.

Julia’s claim of exclusive ownership is belied by the Income Tax Returns which she herself prepared and filed in behalf of the conjugal partnership wherein she made the statement that the rentals paid to her were income of the conjugal partnership, and she made to appear the properties in question as capital assets of the conjugal partnership.

Property acquired during a marriage is presumed to be conjugal and the fact that the land is later registered in the name of only one of the spouses does not destroy its conjugal nature. If the fact that property acquired during marriage was registered in the name of the husband alone does not affect its conjugal nature, neither does registration in the name of the wife.