De Jesus v. Dilag 471 SCRA 176 (2005)

FACTS:

A complaint was filed with the Office of the Court Administrator by Maria Teresa H. De Jesus charging respondent Judge Renato J. Dilag of the RTCOlongapo City, with gross ignorance of the law, rendering unjust orders, abuse of authority and misuse of court processes.

Complainant alleged inter alia that her husband Wolfgang Heinrich Konrad Harlinghausen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City

Harlinghausen, through counsel, filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Preserve Properties to be Collated. On the same day, respondent judge issued an Order setting the hearing of the motion

Complainant received summons. Forthwith, she filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue. This was denied by respondent judge.

Then, respondent judge considered the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Preserve Properties to be Collated submitted for resolution after hearing the testimonies of Harlinghausens attorney-in-fact, Harry E. Joost, and his counsel of record, Atty. Edmundo S. Carian.

Respondent judge issued an Order granting the urgent ex-parte motion and placing under legal custody the properties enumerated therein. The Register of Deeds of Tarlac was directed to annotate the Order on the 62 land titles allegedly purchased by Harlinghausens wife using his money without his consent.

Harlinghausen, through counsel, filed another Ex-Parte Motion praying for the issuance of an Order directing the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) to allow him to enter this country in order to prosecute his petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.

Respondent judge issued an Order granting Harlinghausens Ex-Parte Motion.

Eventually, complainant filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari assailing respondent judge’s Order granting Harlinghausens Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Preserve Properties to be Collated; Order granting his Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to enter this country; and Order denying her (complainants) motion to dismiss the complaint for improper venue. Complainant averred that in issuing the challenged Orders, respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74167.

ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent Judge Dilag committed abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law. Yes.

RULING: Yes. Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, are:

SECTION 4. Hearing of motion. Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.

Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.

SECTION 5. Notice of hearing. The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.

SECTION 6. Proof of service necessary. No written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof.

Respondent judge blatantly disregarded the provisions. Instead of denying the motion outright for being manifestly defective, he granted the same. While he set the motion for hearing, still the three-day notice was not observed, thus complainant failed to attend the hearing. Clearly, she was deprived of her right to due process.

When a judge fails to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law, or a principle in the discharge of his duties, he is either too incompetent and undeserving of his position, or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In both instances, the judge’s dismissal is in order.

Likewise, respondents failure to afford complainant the opportunity to be heard as a matter of due process of law deserves administrative sanction.

Relative to the challenged Order, respondent judge shows his ignorance of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. This law confers upon the Commissioner of the BID, to the exclusion of the courts of justice, the power and authority to enforce its provisions, specifically the admission of foreigners to this country.

We sustain the observation of the Court of Appeals that the Order of respondent judge directing the BID to allow the entry of Harlinghausen to this country would effectively countermand the order of detention issued by the BID and constitutes an intrusion into its prerogatives as regards the entry, admission, exclusion, registration, repatriation, monitoring and deportation of foreigners within our national territory.

In his desperate attempt to evade administrative sanction, respondent judge maintains that since complainant has already resorted to a proper remedy, i.e., by filing a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning his twin Orders, she is barred from filing the instant administrative complaint involving the same Orders. He cited our ruling in Hilario vs. Ocampo III, 371 SCRA 260 (2001) that where some judicial means is available, an administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for an act of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular.

While it is true that the Court of Appeals has set aside the questioned twin Orders, the fact remains that respondent judge has shown his ignorance of both substantive and procedural laws which warrants an administrative sanction.

The Court recognizes that not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, but only in cases within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. Where, however, the procedure is so simple and the facts so evident as to be beyond permissible margins of error, as in this case, to still err thereon amounts to ignorance of the law.

In this case, respondent judge displayed a deplorable deficiency in his grasp of the basic principles governing motions, specifically, the three-day notice rule and the requisite proof of service. Also, he showed his utter lack of knowledge and understanding of our immigration laws.