TOPIC: Union Rationale
FACTS:
1.
Central Santos Lopez Co., Inc dismissed nineteen employees upon
their expulsion from United Sugar Workers Union-ILO. The sugar company assumed
that it had to dismiss the workers by virtue of the closed-shop provision in
the then existing collective bargaining agreement which states that laborers
who are no longer members of good standing in the union may be dismissed by the
respondent company if their dismissal is sought by the union”.
2.
It argued that it has never committed any acts of unfair labor
practice since the union sought the dismissal of the said workers; that it has
a solemn obligation to comply with the terms and conditions of the contract;
and that a closed-shop agreement is sanctioned under this jurisdiction for such
kind of agreement is expressly allowed under the provisions of Republic Act 875
known as the Industrial Peace Act and the dismissal of complainants is merely
an exercise of a right allowed by said law.
3.
It was established that the terminated workers were employed long
before the collective bargaining contract has been entered into. The lower
courts held that the dismissal was justifiable under the closed-shop provision
of the collective bargaining agreement. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or nor a closed-shop provision in a
collective bargaining contract is retroactive
RULING:
NO. In Confederated Sons of Labor v. Anakan Lumber Co., it was said
that "In order that an employer may be deemed bound, under a collective
bargaining agreement, to dismiss employees for non-union membership, the
stipulation to this effect must be so clear and unequivocal as to leave no room
for doubt thereon. An undertaking of this nature is so harsh that it must be
strictly construed, and doubts must be resolved against the existence of
"closed shop"."
Furthermore,
it was stated in Freeman Shirt Manufacturing v. Court of Industrial Relations
that "The closed-shop agreement authorized under sec. 4, subsec. a(4) of
the Industrial Peace Act applies to persons to be hired or to employees who are
not yet members of any labor organization. It is inapplicable to those already
in the service who are members of another union. To hold otherwise, i. e., that
the employees in a company who are members of a minority union may be compelled
to disaffiliate from their union and join the majority or contracting union,
would render nugatory the right of all employees to self-organization and to
form, join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing, a right
guaranteed by the Industrial Peace Act as well as by the Constitution."
According
to the Court, the creation of labor unions is a means of assuring that
fundamental constitutional objectives such as the protection of labor (full
employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities
regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the relations between workers
and employers) and the promotion of social justice (dignity, welfare, and
security of all the people) would be achieved. It is the instrumentality
through which an individual laborer who is helpless as against a powerful
employer may, through concerted effort and activity, achieve the goal of
economic well-being.
That is
the philosophy underlying the Industrial Peace Act. For, rightly has it been
said that workers unorganized are weak; workers organized are strong.
Necessarily then, they join labor unions. To further increase the effectiveness
of such organizations, a closed-shop has been allowed. It could happen, though,
that such a stipulation which assures further weight to a labor union at the
bargaining table could be utilized against minority groups or individual
members thereof. There are indications that such a deplorable situation did so
manifest itself here.
The lower
courts were not sufficiently alert to such a danger. What is worse, it paid no heed
to the controlling doctrine which is merely a recognition of a basic fact in
life, namely, that power in a collectivity could be the means of crushing
opposition and stifling the voices of those who are in dissent.
The right
to join others of like persuasion is indeed valuable. An individual by himself
may feel inadequate to meet the exigencies of life or even to express his
personality without the right to association being vitalized. It could happen
though that whatever group may be in control of the organization may simply
ignore his most-cherished desires and treat him as if he counts for naught. The
antagonism between him and the group becomes marked.
Dissatisfaction
if given expression may be labeled disloyalty. In the labor field, the union under
such circumstances may no longer be a haven of refuge, but indeed as much of a
potential foe as management itself.
DISPOSITIVE:
GUIJARNO et al. won.
DOCTRINE:
Consequently, it is well settled that
such unions are not entitled to arbitrarily exclude qualified applicants for
membership, and a closed-shop provision would not justify the employer in
discharging, or a union in insisting upon the discharge of, an employee whom
the union thus refuses to admit to membership, without any reasonable ground therefor.
Needless to say, if said unions may be compelled to
admit new members, who have the requisite qualifications, with more reason may
the law and the courts exercise the coercive power when the employee involved
is a long standing union member, who, owing to provocations of union officers,
was impelled to tender his resignation, which he forthwith withdrew or revoked.
Surely, he may, at least, invoke the rights of those
who seek admission for the first time, and cannot arbitrarily be denied
re-admission.
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