Monday, December 19, 2016

SALUNGA V. CIR 21 SCRA 216


Topic: Labor Organization; Union – Member Relations; Admission and Discipline of Members

FACTS:
1)     San Miguel Brewery, Inc (Company) entered with the Union, of which respondent John de Castillo is the president, into a CBA.

Section 3 of the CBA reads: The company agrees to require as a condition of employment of those workers covered by this agreement who either are members of the UNION on the date of the signing of this agreement, or may join the UNION during the effectivity of this agreement, that they shall not voluntarily resign from the UNION earlier than thirty (30) days before the expiry date of this agreement as provided in Article XIII hereof, provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to require the company to enforce any sanction whatsoever against any employee or worker who fails to retain his membership in the UNION as hereinbefore stated, for any cause other than voluntary resignation or non-payment of regular union dues on the part of said employee or worker.
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2)     Petitioner Francisco Salunga was a member of the National Brewery and Allied Industries Labor Union of the Philippines (PAFLU) since 1953. On August 18, 1961, he tendered his resignation from the Union. The Union accepted the resignation, and transmitted it to the Company, with a request for the immediate implementation of said Section 3.
3)     The Company informed petitioner that his resignation would result in the termination of his employment, in view of Section 3
4)     Petitioner wrote to the Union a letter withdrawing or revoking his resignation and advising the Union to continue deducting his monthly union dues.
5)     The Union told the Company that petitioner's membership could not be reinstated and insisted on his separation from the service, conformably with the stipulation above-quoted. The Company replied: Mr. Salunga told us that he did not realize that he would be losing his job if he were to resign from the Union. We did not at any time ask or urge him to withdraw his resignation; neither are we now asking or insisting that you readmit him into your membership. We thought that informing him of the consequences of his resignation from the Union, was the only humane thing to do under the circumstances. Nevertheless, if notwithstanding our foregoing clarification you still consider him as having actually resigned from your organization, and you insist that we dismiss him from the service in accordance with Sec. 3, Article II of our agreement, we will have no alternative but to do so. The Company notified petitioner that, in view of said letter and the aforementioned section, "we regret we have to terminate your employment for cause.” Petitioner was discharged from the employment of the Company.
6)     A prosecutor of the Court of Industrial Relations commenced the present proceedings for unfair labor practice against the Union, its president, respondent John de Castillo, respondent Cipriano Cid, as PAFLU president, the Company, and its aforementioned Vice-President Miguel Noel.
7)     The trial Judge rendered a decision directing them to readmit and to continue the membership of Salunga in the membership rolls of the union after paying all union dues
8)     This decision was reversed by the CIR — sitting en banc. Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.


ISSUE: WON petitioner should be readmitted.


RULING: YES. Having been denied readmission into the Union and having been dismissed from the service owing to an unfair labor practice on the part of the Union, petitioner is entitled to reinstatement as member of the Union.

The appeal is well taken, for, although petitioner had resigned from the Union and the latter had accepted the resignation, the former had, soon later — upon learning that his withdrawal from the Union would result in his separation from the Company, owing to the closed-shop provision above referred to — revoked or withdrawn said resignation, and the Union refused to consent thereto without any just cause therefor.

The Union had not only acted arbitrarily in not allowing petitioner to continue his membership. The trial Judge found said refusal of the Union officers to be due to his critical attitude towards certain measures taken or sanctioned by them. As set forth in the decision of the trial Judge:
. . . Prior to August, 1961, he had been criticizing and objecting to what he believed were illegal or irregular disbursements of union funds. Salunga was later removed by the union from his position as steward without his knowledge, and that the union did not honor the of attorney executed in his favor by Alejandro Miranda, a co-worker, for the collection of Miranda's indebtedness of P60.00 to him. 

The officers of the Union tried to justify themselves by characterizing said criticisms as acts of disloyalty to the Union, which, of course, is not true, not only because the criticism assailed, not the Union, but certain acts of its officers, and, indirectly, the officers themselves, but also because the Constitution and By-laws of the Union explicitly recognize the right of its members to give their views on "all transactions made by the Union." 

Although, generally, a state may not compel ordinary voluntary associations to admit thereto any given individual, because membership therein may be accorded or withheld as a matter of privilege, the rule is qualified in respect of labor unions holding a monopoly in the supply of labor, either in a given locality, or as regards a particular employer with which it has a closed-shop agreement. The reason is that
. . . The closed shop and the union shop cause the admission requirements of trade union to become affected with the public interest. Likewise, a closed shop, a union shop, or maintenance of membership clauses cause the administration of discipline by unions to be affected with the public interest.

Consequently, it is well settled that such unions are not entitled to arbitrarily exclude qualified applicants for membership, and a closed-shop provision would not justify the employer in discharging, or a union in insisting upon the discharge of, an employee whom the union thus refuses to admit to membership, without any reasonable ground therefor. Needless to say, if said unions may be compelled to admit new members, who have the requisite qualifications, with more reason may the law and the courts exercise the coercive power when the employee involved is a long standing union member, who, owing to provocations of union officers, was impelled to tender his resignation, which he forthwith withdrew or revoked. Surely, he may, at least, invoke the rights of those who seek admission for the first time, and can not arbitrarily he denied readmission.

We cannot agree, however, with the finding of the trial Judge to the effect that the Company was guilty of unfair labor practice. The Company was reluctant — if not unwilling — to discharge the petitioner. When the Union first informed the Company of petitioner's resignation and urged implementation of Section 3 of the bargaining contract, the Company advised petitioner of the provision thereof, thereby intimating that he had to withdraw his resignation in order to keep his employment. Besides, the Company notified the Union that it (the Company) would not take any action on the case and would consider the petitioner, "still a member" of the Union. When the latter, thereafter, insisted on petitioner's discharge, the Company still demurred and explained it was not taking sides and that its stand was prompted merely by "humane" considerations, springing from the belief that petitioner had resigned from the Union without realizing its effect upon his employment. And, as the Union reiterated its demand, the Company notified petitioner that it had no other alternative but to terminate his employment, and dismissed him from the service, although with "regret".

Under these circumstances, the Company was not "unfair" to the petitioner. At the same time, the Company could not safely inquire into the motives of the Union officers, in refusing to allow the petitioner to withdraw his resignation. The arbitrary nature of the decision of said officers was not such as to be apparent and to justify the company in regarding said decision unreasonable. Moreso, the petitioner had appealed to the National Officers of the PAFLU and the latter had sustained the Union. The Company was justified in presuming that the PAFLU had inquired into all relevant circumstances, including the motives of the Union Officers.

Having been denied readmission into the Union and having been dismissed from the service owing to an unfair labor practice on the part of the Union, petitioner is entitled to reinstatement as member of the Union and to his former or substantially equivalent position in the Company, without prejudice to his seniority and/or rights and privileges, and with back pay, which back pay shall be borne exclusively by the Union. 


DISPOSITVE: Petitioner won.


DOCTRINE: Although, generally, a state may not compel ordinary voluntary associations to admit thereto any given individual, because membership therein may be accorded or withheld as a matter of privilege, the rule is qualified in respect of labor unions holding a monopoly in the supply of labor, either in a given locality, or as regards a particular employer with which it has a closed-shop agreement.

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