Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. NO. 157294-95
DATE: November 30, 2006
PONENTE:
CARPIO-MORALES
FACTS:
The
Special Prosecution Panel filed before the Sandiganbayan a Request for Issuance
of Subpoena Duces Tecum for the issuance of a subpoena directing the President
of Export and Industry Bank (EIB, formerly Urban Bank) or his/her authorized
representative to produce documents relating to Trust Account No. 858 and
Savings Account of President Estrada. The SB granted the request.
Estrada
filed a Motion to Quash the subpoenas claiming that his bank accounts are
covered by R.A. No. 1405 (The Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) and do not fall
under any of the exceptions stated therein. He further claimed that the specific
identification of documents in the questioned subpoenas, including details on
dates and amounts, could only have been made possible by an earlier illegal
disclosure thereof by the EIB and the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation
(PDIC) in its capacity as receiver of the then Urban Bank. The disclosure being
illegal, petitioner concluded, the prosecution in the case may not be allowed
to make use of the information. The SB denied the motion.
ISSUE/S:
1.
Is the Trust Account covered by the term “deposit”under the Bank Secrecy Law?
2.
Are the Trust and Savings Accounts of Estrada excepted from the protection of
the Bank Secrecy Law?
3.
Does the fruit of poisonous tree principle apply?
RULING:
1.
YES. The contention that trust accounts are not covered by the term “deposits,”as
used in R.A. 1405, by the mere fact that they do not entail a creditor-debtor
relationship between the trustor and the bank, does not lie. An examination of
the law shows that the term “deposits”used therein is to be understood broadly
and not limited only to accounts which give rise to a creditor-debtor
relationship between the depositor and the bank. If the money deposited under
an account may be used by banks for authorized loans to third persons, then
such account, regardless of whether it creates a creditor-debtor relationship
between the depositor and the bank, falls under the category of accounts which
the law precisely seeks to protect for the purpose of boosting the economic
development of the country.
Trust
Account No. 858 is, without doubt, one such account. The Trust Agreement
between Estrada and Urban Bank provides that the trust account covers “deposit,
placement or investment of funds”by Urban Bank for and in behalf of Estrada.
The money deposited under Trust Account No. 858, was, therefore, intended not
merely to remain with the bank but to be invested by it elsewhere. To hold that
this type of account is not protected by R.A. 1405 would encourage private
hoarding of funds that could otherwise be invested by banks in other ventures,
contrary to the policy behind the law.
The
phrase “of whatever nature”proscribes any restrictive interpretation of “deposits.”Moreover,
it is clear from the immediately quoted provision that, generally, the law
applies not only to money which is deposited but also to those which are
invested. This further shows that the law was not intended to apply only to “deposits”in
the strict sense of the word. Otherwise, there would have been no need to add
the phrase “or invested.” Clearly, therefore, R.A. 1405 is broad enough to
cover Trust Account No. 858.
2.
YES. The protection afforded by the law is, however, not absolute, there being
recognized exceptions thereto, as abovequoted Section 2 provides. In the
present case, two exceptions apply, to wit: (1) the examination of bank
accounts is upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction
of duty of public officials, and (2) the money deposited or invested is the
subject matter of the litigation.
Estrada
contends that since plunder is neither bribery nor dereliction of duty, his
accounts are not excepted from the protection of R.A. 1405. He is wrong. Cases
of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty
and no reason is seen why these two classes of cases cannot be excepted from
the rule making bank deposits confidential. The policy as to one cannot be
different from the policy as to the other. This policy expresses the notion
that a public office is a public trust and any person who enters upon its discharge
does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to his duty,
is open to public scrutiny. An examination of the “overt or criminal acts as
described in Section 1(d)”of R.A. No. 7080 would make the similarity between
plunder and bribery even more pronounced since bribery is essentially included
among these criminal acts. Plunder being thus analogous to bribery, the
exception to R.A. 1405 applicable in cases of bribery must also apply to cases
of plunder.
The
plunder case now pending with the SB necessarily involves an inquiry into the
whereabouts of the amount purportedly acquired illegally by former President
Joseph Estrada. In light then of this Court’s pronouncement in Union Bank, the
subject matter of the litigation cannot be limited to bank accounts under the
name of President Estrada alone, but must include those accounts to which the
money purportedly acquired illegally or a portion thereof was alleged to have been
transferred. Trust Account No. 858 and Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9 in the
name of petitioner fall under this description and must thus be part of the
subject matter of the litigation.
In
sum, exception (1) applies since the plunder case pending against former
President Estrada is analogous to bribery or dereliction of duty, while
exception (2) applies because the money deposited in petitioner’s bank accounts
is said to form part of the subject matter of the same plunder case.
3.
NO. The “fruit of the poisonous tree”principle, which states that once the
primary source (the “tree”)
is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence
(the “fruit”) derived from
it is also inadmissible, does not apply in this case. In the first place, R.A.
1405 does not provide for the application of this rule. R.A. 1405, it bears
noting, nowhere provides that an unlawful examination of bank accounts shall
render the evidence obtained therefrom inadmissible in evidence. Moreover,
there is no basis for applying the same in this case since the primary source
for the detailed information regarding petitioner’s bank accounts—the
investigation previously conducted by the Ombudsman—was lawful.
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