FACTS: Accused-appellant Feliza Munar was
originally charged with grave slander in the municipal court of San Fernando,
La Union for having uttered defamatory words in calling the offended party,
Erlinda Munar, an unmarried woman and a distant relative, the paramour of
somebody.
The trial court thereafter
rendered its decision of wherein like the municipal court it rejected as not
worthy of credence the accused's defense of alibi that she was in Manila on the
day of the commission of the offense and took a moderate view of her defamatory
remarks, finding her guilty merely of slight slander.
The accused filed a motion
for reconsideration praying for acquittal and for reduction of the civil
liability. The trial court denied reconsideration, rejecting the belated
objection raised for the first time by accused as to the proceedings being
invalid because the private prosecutor conducted the examination of the
witnesses on three hearing days, notwithstanding his announcement — later
withdrawn — that the offended party would file a separate civil case and ruling
correctly that since the government prosecutors were present at the hearings,
the prosecution of the case remained under their control and the private
prosecutor's presence and participation which were then not objected to were
"of no particular importance."
The accused thereafter filed
her notice of appeal directly to the Supreme Court "solely on a question
of law, to wit: that there was no legal basis for the judgment of conviction
because the proceedings were null and void as the private prosecutor had no
legal personality to represent, or present evidence for, the prosecution in
view of the reservation of the civil action, as borne out by the records."
[1]
WON the private prosecutor for the offended party had no legal
personality to conduct the examination of some witnesses and that his
participation rendered null and void the proceedings
[2] WON the crime of grave
slander of which
accused-appellant was charged comes within the area of concurrent jurisdiction
of Municipal Courts of Provincial Capitals or City Courts and Courts of First
Instance,
[3] WON the judgment of the
La Union Court of First Instance to which accused-appellant had expressly
appealed the municipal court's conviction should be deemed null and void for
want of jurisdiction as her appeal should have been directly to the Court of
Appeals or Supreme Court
HELD:
[1]
No.
[2]
Yes. The question is foreclosed by the doctrine of estoppel enunciated
by the Court that "after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering
an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the
jurisdiction or power of the court."
[3] No.
RATIO:
[1]
Accused-appellant hold that private prosecutor for the
offended party had no legal personality to conduct the examination of some
witnesses and that his participation rendered null and void the proceedings is
manifestly without merit. Aside from the fact that accused's objection brought
up only in her motion for reconsideration was too late, the objection had no
valid basis since the private prosecutor had withdrawn the reservation to file
a separate civil case and prosecution of the case remained at all times under
the control of the government prosecutors.
[2] As restated in Crisostomo vs. Reyes and a number of subsequent cases, the
principle decrees that "While the jurisdiction of a tribunal may be
challenged at any time, sound public policy bars the petitioners from so doing after
their having procured that jurisdiction themselves, speculating on the fortunes
of litigation."
[3] As the People's brief
puts it, an appellant cannot be permitted to experiment with the court - the
court of first instance in the case of herein appellant — by submitting herself
to its jurisdiction and after the experiment has proved unsuccessful for her
with the rendition of an adverse decision to raise for the first time
its lack of jurisdiction. As restated by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion in Francisco vs. City of Davao, the
ends of justice would not be served if such belated jurisdictional questions
were to be entertained and the proceedings nullified — when the court's
jurisdiction had been invoked all the time by the party who would now belatedly
question its jurisdiction because of its adverse decision.
Sound public policy
and the interests of a just, orderly, efficient and inexpensive administration
of justice, whereby justice and fairness are accorded both to plaintiff and
defendant, to the offended party as well as to the accused, properly raise a
barrier against a party who would speculate on the fortunes of litigation and
in the event of an adverse decision challenge the jurisdiction of the very
tribunal whose jurisdiction he or she has invoked and procured at the
expenditure of so much time, expense and effort on the part of the litigants
and of the State.
As a matter of
substantial justice, both the municipal court and the court of first instance
in the case at bar had dealt with the criminal charge of grave slander against
the accused-appellant as if it were one of slight slander punishable with a
penalty of arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding P200.00 — and
both courts imposed merely a fine well below the maximum of P200.00.
In this context, the
municipal court can be said to have properly exercised exclusive original
jurisdiction and the court of first instance to have properly exercised
appellate jurisdiction as invoked by the accused-appellant herself — and she
cannot now be allowed to question for the very first time here the very
jurisdiction invoked by her, especially where she has raised no question
whatever as to the correctness in fact and in law of the penalty and civil
liability imposed upon her by the lower court's judgment.
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