SAMSON V. DAWAY AND CATERPILLAR, INC.

SAMSON V. DAWAY AND CATERPILLAR, INC.

G.R. NO. 160054-55

DATE: July 21, 2004

PONENTE: YNARES-SANTIAGO

FACTS: Two informations for unfair competition were filed against Samson, the registered owner of ITTI shoes. The infomations state that Samson did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously distribute, sell and/or offer for sale CATERPILLAR products such as footwear, garments, clothing, bags, accessories and paraphernalia which are closely identical to and/or colorable imitations of the authentic Caterpillar products and likewise using trademarks, symbols and/or designs as would cause confusion, mistake or deception on the part of the buying public to the damage and prejudice of CATERPILLAR, INC., the prior adopter, user and owner of the following internationally: “CATERPILLAR,” “CAT,” “CATERPILLAR & DESIGN,” “CAT AND DESIGN,” “WALKING MACHINES” and “TRACK-TYPE TRACTOR & DESIGN.”

Samson filed a motion to suspend the arraignment and other proceedings in view of the existence of an alleged prejudicial question involving a civil case for unfair competition pending with the same branch, and also in view of the pendency of a petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice assailing the Chief State Prosecutor’s resolution finding probable cause to charge petitioner with unfair competition.

The TC judge denied the motion and arraignment ensued.  Thereafter, Samson filed a motion to quash the informations contending that since under Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293, the penalty of imprisonment for unfair competition does not exceed six years, the offense is cognizable by the Municipal Trial Courts and not by the Regional Trial Court, per R.A. No. 7691. The TC judge denied the motion. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE/S:

1. Which court has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases for violation of intellectual property rights?

2. Did the TC judge commit grave abuse of discretion when he refused to suspend the proceedings on the ground of existence of prejudicial question and a pending petition for review before the Sec. of Justice on the finding of probable cause for unfair competition?

RULING:

1. RTC. Under Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293, which took effect on January 1, 1998, the criminal penalty for infringement of registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of origin and false description or representation, is imprisonment from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging from Fifty Thousand Pesos to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos. Corollarily, Section 163 of the same Code states that actions (including criminal and civil) under Sections 150, 155, 164, 166, 167, 168 and 169 shall be brought before the proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws.

The existing law referred to in the foregoing provision is Section 27 of R.A. No. 166 (The Trademark Law) which provides that jurisdiction over cases for infringement of registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of origin and false description or representation, is lodged with the CFI (now RTC). We find no merit in the claim of Samson that R.A. No. 166 was expressly repealed by R.A. No. 8293. The use of the phrases “parts of Acts” and “inconsistent herewith” only means that the repeal pertains only to provisions which are repugnant or not susceptible of harmonization with R.A. No. 8293.7 Section 27 of R.A. No. 166, however, is consistent and in harmony with Section 163 of R.A. No. 8293. Had R.A. No. 8293 intended to vest jurisdiction over violations of intellectual property rights with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, it would have expressly stated so under Section 163 thereof.

Moreover, the settled rule in statutory construction is that in case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail. Jurisdiction conferred by a special law to Regional Trial Courts must prevail over that granted by a general law to Municipal Trial Courts. In the case at bar, R.A. No. 8293 and R.A. No. 166 are special laws conferring jurisdiction over violations of intellectual property rights to the Regional Trial Court. They should therefore prevail over R.A. No. 7691, which is a general law. Hence, jurisdiction over the instant criminal case for unfair competition is properly lodged with the Regional Trial Court even if the penalty therefor is imprisonment of less than 6 years, or from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging from P50,000.00 to P200,000.00.

In fact, to implement and ensure the speedy disposition of cases involving violations of intellectual property rights under R.A. No. 8293, the Court issued A.M. No. 02-1-11-SC dated February 19, 2002 designating certain Regional Trial Courts as Intellectual Property Courts. On June 17, 2003, the Court further issued a Resolution consolidating jurisdiction to hear and decide Intellectual Property Code and Securities and Exchange Commission cases in specific Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Commercial Courts.

2. NO. Samson failed to substantiate his claim that there was a prejudicial question. He made no discussion in support of said prayer in his petition and reply to comment. Neither did he attach a copy of the complaint in Civil Case nor quote the pertinent portion thereof to prove the existence of a prejudicial question. At any rate, there is no prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.

In the case at bar, the common element in the acts constituting unfair competition under Section 168 of R.A. No. 8293 is fraud. Pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, in cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Hence, Civil Case No. Q-00-41446, which as admitted by Caterpilar also relate to unfair competition, is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal cases at bar.

While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.

In the instant case, Samson failed to establish that respondent Judge abused his discretion in denying his motion to suspend. His pleadings and annexes submitted before the Court do not show the date of filing of the petition for review with the Secretary of Justice.15Moreover, the Order dated August 9, 2002 denying his motion to suspend was not appended to the petition. He thus failed to discharge the burden of proving that he was entitled to a suspension of his arraignment and that the questioned orders are contrary to Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Indeed, the age-old but familiar rule is that he who alleges must prove his allegations.