Heirs of Dicman v. Cariño 490 SCRA 240 (2006)

FACTS:

1.      Sioco Carino bought a parcel of land together with its improvements from HC Heald and took possession of it.

2.      On the advice of his lawyers, and because there were already many parcels of land recorded in his name, Sioco Cariño caused the survey of the land in controversy in the name of Ting-el Dicman.

3.      Ting-el Dicman executed a public instrument entitled "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" wherein it stated that Mr. Sioco Cariño has advanced all expenses for said survey for him that for and in consideration of said advance expenses, made to him, he promises to convey, deliver and transfer one half (1/2) of his title, rights, and interest to and in the aforesaid parcel of land as soon as title for the same is issued to me by proper authorities.

4.      After the execution of the foregoing deed, Sioco Cariño, who had been in possession of the land in controversy since 1916, continued to stay thereon.

5.      On January 10, 1938, Sioco Cariño executed, as seller, a public instrument entitled "Deed of Absolute Sale" covering the subject land and its improvements with his son, Guzman Cariño, as buyer.

6.      On July 27, 1954, Guzman Cariño had the entire Lot 46 resurveyed so as to indicate the half portion that belonged to him and the other half that belonged to the petitioners. The resurvey evenly divided the lot into Lot 76-A and 76-B, and purportedly indicated that Lot 76-A, consisting of 50,953 square meters, belonged to the petitioners, while Lot 76-B, also consisting of 50,953 square meters, formerly pertained to Sioco Cariño and, later, to Guzman Cariño.

7.      Before the trial court could dispose of the case, the Supreme Court promulgated Republic v. Marcos9 which held that Courts of First Instance of Baguio have no jurisdiction to reopen judicial proceedings on the basis of Republic Act No. 931. As a consequence, on July 28, 1978, the trial court dismissed the petition to reopen Civil Reservation Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. 211 insofar as Lot 76-B was concerned, and the certificate of title issued pursuant to the partial decision involving Lot 76-A was invalidated.

8.      After the dismissal of the case, Guzman Cariño was left undisturbed in his possession of the subject property until his death on August 19, 1982. Guzman’s widow and son, private respondent Jose Sioco C. Cariño, continued possession of the subject property.

9.      On April 20, 1983, petitioners, suing as compulsory heirs of Ting-el Dicman, revived the foregoing case by filing a complaint for recovery of possession with damages involving the subject property with the RTC.

1.  Respondent Carino, however, alleged that he has been in possession of the subject property for 55 years peacefully, in good faith, and in concept of owner and therefore perfected title over the same through acquisitive prescription.

1.  RTC declared that Carino he lawful possessor and as the party who has the better right over the land subject matter.

1.  CA dismissed the petition and affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent have better title over the disputed land.

RULING: Yes. The records show that as early as 1938, the land in controversy had been in the possession of Guzman Cariño, predecessor-in-interest of private respondent, continuously, publicly, peacefully, in concept of owner, and in good faith with just title, to the exclusion of the petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest, well beyond the period required under law to acquire title by acquisitive prescription which, in this case, is 10 years.

Although arguably Sioco Cariño may not have been the owner of the subject property when he executed the "Deed of Absolute Sale" in 1938 in favor of his son, the requirement of just title is nonetheless satisfied, which means that the mode of transferring ownership should ordinarily have been valid and true, had the grantor been the owner.

By the time the successors-in-interest of Ting-el Dicman sought to establish ownership over the land in controversy by filing their "Petition of the Heirs of Dicman to Reopen Civil Reservation Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. 211" on April 24, 1959 with the trial court, and which Guzman timely opposed, more than 20 years had already elapsed. Thus, the 10-year period for acquisitive prescription is deemed satisfied well before Guzman’s possession can be said to be civilly interrupted by the filing of the foregoing petition to reopen

Prescinding from the issue on prescription, the petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest are nonetheless guilty of laches.

As correctly held by the RTC, there is no evidence to the effect that Ting-el Dicman or his successors-in-interest ever filed any action to question the validity of the "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" after its execution on October 22, 1928 despite having every opportunity to do so. Nor was any action to recover possession of the property from Guzman Cariño instituted anytime prior to April 24, 1959, a time when the period for acquisitive prescription, reckoned from Guzman’s occupation of the property in 1938, had already transpired in his favor. No evidence likewise appears on the record that Sioco Cariño or his Estate ever filed any action to contest the validity of the "Deed of Absolute Sale" dated January 10, 1938.

Private respondent and his predecessors-in-interest were made to feel secure in the belief that no action would be filedagainst them by such passivity. There is no justifiable reason for petitioners’ delay in asserting their rights—the facts in their entirety show that they have slept on them. For over 30 years reckoned from the "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" dated October 22, 1928, or 20 years reckoned from the "Deed of Absolute Sale" dated January 10, 1938, they neglected to take positive steps to assert their dominical claim over the property. With the exception of forgery, all other issues concerning the validity of the two instruments abovementioned, as well as the averment that the former was in the nature of a contract to sell, were issues raised only for the first time on appeal and cannot therefore be taken up at this late a stage.