FACTS:
1. This is a case for the recovery of possession and
damages with a prayer for a writ of replevin.
Private respondents filed their Answer and a copy was furnished to the
counsel of petitioner by registered mail but the pleading did not contain and
written explanation why personal service was not made upon petitioner-plaintiff
as required by the Rules of Court.
2. On 11 August 1997, petitioner filed a motion to
expunge the "Answer (with Counterclaims)" and to declare herein
private respondents in default, 5 alleging therein that the latter did not
observe the mandate of the aforementioned Section 11, and that there was: [A]bsolutely
no valid reason why defendant[s] should not have personally served plaintiff's
. . . counsel with [a] copy of their answer [as] (t)he office of defendant's
(sic) counsel, Atty. Froilan Cabaltera, is just a stone [sic] throw away from
the office of [petitioner's] counsel, with an estimate (sic) distance of about
200 meters more or less.
3. Petitioner further alleged that the post office was
"about ten (10) times farther from the office of Atty. Cabaltera,"
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in denying petitioner's motion to expunge private respondents' answer with
counterclaims on the ground that said pleading was not served personally
RULING: We thus take this opportunity to
clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of
service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing
is practicable, in light of the circumstances of time, place and person,
personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing
is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be
accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was
not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation,
a court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the
case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading
sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11. This Court cannot rule
otherwise, lest we allow circumvention of the innovation introduced by the 1997
Rules in order to obviate delay in the administration of justice.
Returning,
however, to the merits of this case, in view of the proximity between the
offices of opposing counsel and the absence of any attendant explanation as to
why personal service of the answer was not effected, indubitably, private
respondents' counsel violated Section 11 of Rule 13 and the motion to expunge
was prima facie meritorious. However, the grant or denial of said motion
nevertheless remained within the sound exercise of the trial court's
discretion. Thus, as guided by Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which ordains that the Rules shall be liberally construed in order
to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action or proceeding, as well as by the dictum laid down
in Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315 [1910], the trial court opted to exercise
its discretion in favor of admitting the "Answer (with
Counterclaims)," instead of expunging it from the record.
The
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect only on 1 July 1997, while the questioned
"Answer (with Counterclaims)" was filed only on 8 August 1997, or on
the 39th day following the effectivity of the 1997 Rules. Hence, private
respondents' counsel may not have been fully aware of the requirements and
ramifications of Section 11, Rule 13. In fact, as pointed out by petitioner's
counsel, in another case where private respondents' counsel was likewise
opposing counsel, the latter similarly failed to comply with Section 11
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