REPUBLIC SAVINGS BANK vs. CIR G.R. No. L-20303

TOPIC: Extent and Scope of Right to Self-Organization

FACTS:

1.     The Bank employs Resuello et. al. In 1958, it then discharged the private respondents for having written a patently libelous letter tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt not only of officers and employees of this bank, but also of the bank itself.

2.     The letter was actually a letter-charge, which Private Respondents had written to the bank president, demanding his resignation on the grounds of immorality, nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as discrimination to bank employees.

3.     At the instance of respondents, Prosecutor A. Tirona filed a complaint in the CIR alleging that the Bank violated the Industrial Peace Act, which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate against an employee for having filed charges.

4.     In 1960, however, the Supreme Court overruled the decision of the CIR in the Royal Interocean case and held that "the charge, the filing of which is the cause of the dismissal of the employee, must be related to his right to self-organization in order to give rise to unfair labor practice on the part of the employer," because "under subsection 5 of section 4(a), the employee's (1) having filed charges or (2) having given testimony or (3) being about to give testimony, are modified by 'under this Act' appearing after the last item."

5.     Relying upon Royal Interocean Lines v. CIR, and Lakas ng Pagkakaisa sa Peter Paul v. CIR, the Bank argues that the court should have dismissed the complaint because the discharge of the respondents had nothing to do with their union activities as the latter in fact admitted at the hearing that the writing of the letter-charge was not a "union action" but merely their "individual" act.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Bank conducted unfair labor practice

RULING: Yes. The action of the private respondents will affect their labor organization.

Assuming that the private respondents acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the letter-charge they were nonetheless protected for they were engaged in concerted activity, in the exercise of their right of self-organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, interference with which constitutes an unfair labor practice under section 4(a)(1). This is the view of some members of this Court. For, as has been aptly stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a small group of employees, if in furtherance of their interests as such, is a concerted activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated.

Indeed, when the respondents complained against nepotism, favoritism and other management practices, they were acting within an area marked out by the Act as a proper sphere of collective bargaining. Even the reference to immorality was not irrelevant as it was made to support the respondents' other charge that the bank president had failed to provide wholesome working conditions, let alone a good moral example, for the employees by practicing discrimination and favoritism in the appointment and promotion of certain employees on the basis of illicit relations or blood relationship with them.

DISPOSITIVE: Private Respondents won. In final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's conduct, identified as an interference with the employees' right of self-organization, or as a retaliatory action, and/or as a refusal to bargain collectively, constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning and intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act.

DOCTRINE: Assuming that the private respondents acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the letter-charge they were nonetheless protected for they were engaged in concerted activity, in the exercise of their right of self-organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, interference with which constitutes an unfair labor practice under section 4(a)(1). This is the view of some members of this Court. For, as has been aptly stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a small group of employees, if in furtherance of their interests as such, is a concerted activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated.